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The ‗rise of the Private Military Industry‘ has been cemented in modern global 
political reality, but where next will this multi-billion dollar industry go and what 
form will it take after the market boom of Iraq? Post-Colonial Africa is considered the 
birthplace of the modern mercenary and historically features prominently as a 
testament to the potential for immoral privately sponsored military activities within 
unstable states. Moreover, it is a rich market that the Private Military Industry is 
increasingly turning its attention to, albeit focussing on support functions for now, but 
a massive industry with a competitive and poorly regulated market environment will 
invariably begin to explore different avenues as competition grows. With market 
diversification grows the ethical risk of abuse. At the same time, peacekeeping efforts 
across the continent are hampered by numerous factors, not least of all a chronic lack 
of trained personnel. Could the legal and political legitimacy, not to mention the 
sustainable market environment sought by the PMI potentially exist in multilaterally 
sanctioned, privatised peacekeeping and peace support operations in Africa? Can the 
ethical challenges of ‗mercenarism‘ be suspended or even bypassed for the sake of 
expedient intervention in potential genocides, or be perhaps pragmatically accepted as 
an inevitable development that should be embraced rather than condemned, for 
strategic security reasons? Can the ethical condemnation of the proposed means of 
peace support be overridden by the potential ends generated by such a move? Is the 
world ready for privatised peacekeepers? This dissertation explores the ethical 
background to the privatisation of military operations and how these foreign policy 
trends and social perceptions of control of force impact on the notion of privatised 
peacekeeping, particularly in the context of operations in Africa. It investigates the 
philosophical implications of privatised peacekeeping by way of a constrained 
pragmatic form of consequentialist evaluation that warns against reckless expediency. 
Ultimately, this dissertation offers a more philosophically suitable argument to justify 
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Contemporary global society can be said to expect and even demand humanitarian 
intervention as a primary function of the United Nations.
1
 In Africa, there is a 
commonly accepted need for peace support operations – and a desperate lack of 
capacity to provide that function, not to mention a number of other critical challenges 
that hinder effective humanitarian intervention on the continent.
2
 Running parallel to 
this, the ‗rise of the Private Military Industry‘
3
 has offered a new lease on life for 
traditional mercenarism, that has been praised and integrated into some nations‘ 
foreign policies, and condemned and declared illegal by others. There has been a 
diverse global response to the Private Military Industry (PMI) in terms of legal and 
political approaches to the industry – however the formal academic response to the 
subject, specifically in terms of an ethical evaluation, has been limited (Baker 2008, p. 
31). Ethical debate on the PMI tends to revolve around the same points of contention 
as debates on traditional mercenarism. This has created some debate on the question 
of whether the modern iteration of privatised security is morally distinguishable from 
traditional mercenarism. The fact that many of the anti-PMI arguments are reliant on 
significantly outdated premises suggests that his debate has stalled without 
encompassing a dramatically changing global environment and the new complexities 
associated with humanitarian application. Simply, does the potential for privatisation 
of peace support functions offer a new avenue for this debate or is it merely an 
expansion of the same area of concern relating to traditional mercenarism and the 
modern corporate privatisation of force? I believe it does, and indeed, there is a 
significant body of argument posed in favour of privatisation of peacekeeping despite 
the moral misgivings that persist over the PMI. Therefore, the question posed is 
whether the practicalities and inevitabilities of privatised peacekeeping necessitate 
expedient treatment of the ethical concerns? 
 
 
                                                 
1
 James Pattison (2007) makes this argument, drawing from Neil McFarlane et al 2004 and the 2001 
ICISS report entitled The Responsibility to Protect. 
2
 Mentioned for instance in Christopher Clapham‘s article Whither Peacekeeping in Africa? 
(Monograph 36, April 1999). Additionally, the Brahmin report describes problems in force projection 
and specialisation that is typical throughout UN operations. (Commented on in the United States 
Institute of Peace Special Report, 13, 02, 2001). 
3
 A phrase commonly attributed to P.W. Singer. 
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In 1998, Kofi Annan delivered a speech at the 35
th
 Ditchley Foundation Lecture, 
entitled Intervention (Annan, 1998). He mentioned turning down the possibility of 
private assistance in the Rwandan refugee camps in Goma. His rejection of the 
privatisation proposal was based on his feeling that the world may not be ready for 
privatised peace. In order to provide an evaluation of an argument that promotes 
privatised peacekeeping, it is necessary to understand why Kofi Annan would feel 
that the world might not be ready for ‗private peace‘. This requires an understanding 
of the background to the question of privatisation. 
 
In Chapter One, I provide a historical background to the notion of mercenarism, 
leading into the establishment of the PMI. I also provide details of the legal treatment 
of this notion. This leads into Chapter Two, which sketches out the academic debate 
on the topic. The mercenarism debate relates to a question of the ethical validity of 
mercenarism itself – resulting in an evaluation of privately wielded force in either 
consequentialist or deontological terms (with tangents heading off towards notions of 
pacifism and non-interventionist idealism). Additional questions arise on the political-
philosophical implications of the privatisation of force, specifically in terms of the 
monopoly over force arising from Hobbesian Social Contract Theory (Hobbes 1996). 
Despite the level of sophistication at which this discussion can take place, the PMI 
has largely been argued for and against at an informal level, relying on selective 
empirical evidence and unsophisticated utilitarian arguments. Pertinently to this 
dissertation, the privatisation of peacekeeping is often on the receiving end of similar 
attention. The general debate of mercenarism tends to stall at a subjective 
incompatibility between fundamentally consequentialist and deontological 
perspectives relating to the means and ends of privatisation of force. I argue that the 
consequentialist arguments lose veracity amongst the myriad consequences of 
privatisation, while creaking along on an outdated framework of civil-military 
relations. The deontological arguments rely on long-held moral judgements of 
mercenaries and subsequently equate mercenaries to contemporary private 
contractors. Chapters One and Two of this dissertation combine to outline areas of 
debate relating to the concept of mercenarism and how it compares to the modern 
iteration of privatisation of force. This is to establish the ethical terrain for the further 
question on the privatisation of peace, offering some of the important areas of concern 
while sidestepping some of the dead ends of this debate. 
 8 
 
The privatisation of peacekeeping, specifically with a view towards application in 
Africa is the central topic of this dissertation. The third chapter of this dissertation 
focuses on the peacekeeping side of the proposed privatised peacekeeping 
relationship. The emphasis here is on the changing nature of peacekeeping and the 
challenges facing peacekeeping operations particularly in Africa. Africa attracts the 
bulk of peacekeeping operations currently, and also exhibits some of the most recent 
mercenary history, which has created a particularly negative legal, political and social 
perception of mercenarism and the PMI. As such, privatisation of peacekeeping 
specifically in Africa, generates significantly contrasting perceptions of the positive 
and negative outcomes of such a proposal. There is also an inevitability about the 
eventual privatised military market migration from the Middle East to Africa. The 
question then is, in what form will this market develop? This chapter reveals the 
failing points of peacekeeping, with regards to conceptual and practical hindrances, 
and sets the scene for arguments on potential ways in which privatisation can help. In 
chapter Four, I examine some of the arguments presented in favour of the notion of 
privatisation of peacekeeping, particularly with regards to what I refer to as an 
‗expediency argument‘. This argument, tends to originate from a pro-PMI perspective 
and utilises what I show to be an inadequate and invalid form of consequentialist 
thinking to justify privatisation along what effectively amounts to pragmatic 
expediency without due consideration of the consequences of such a move. I then 
suggest a revision of this argument. This expands on the basic motivation behind 
privatisation, and systematically addresses the concerns relating to privatisation, 
instead of bypassing them.  
 
The primary task of this dissertation is to establish an ethically informed evaluation of 
a particular type of argument that proposes a marriage between the requirements of 
the Private Military Industry and the peacekeeping needs of the world (albeit, 
specifically in Africa as far as this paper is concerned). It is a secondary goal of this 
dissertation to establish a more comprehensive and ethically justifiable argument in 








Origins of the Private Military Industry 
 
Introduction 
This opening chapter provides a brief overview of the Private Military Industry (PMI) 
phenomenon. The modern world is gripped by the outsourcing and privatisation trend 
(Alexander et al 2008). Public transport, schooling and healthcare: privatisation of 
functions previously performed by the state is increasingly the norm. But the 
transition to privatised military services pushes this trend to new levels in terms of 
legal, economic, political and social implications. It has therefore generated 
considerable debate and remains a controversial notion.  
 
From the perspective of the modern global business realm, there is a growing 
awareness of the complexity relationship that exists between areas of business, of 
government and of society (Steiner 2007). The privatisation trend constantly puts 
stress on the fundamental tenets of this relationship, and it is conceivably in the realm 
of the privatisation of force that this relationship is most tested. This chapter provides 
a history of the privatisation of force, beginning with mercenarism in its traditional 
form, leading to the post-colonial mercenary and on to the contemporary Private 
Security or Military Contractor,
4
 The aim of this historical background is to 
underscore the contrast between traditional mercenarism and the modern form, to 
establish key concepts that are specific to the outsourcing of military services, and to 
refine the terminology entailed by this. This historical briefing then leads into an 
overview of the legalities of the topic – specifically highlighting the ‗grey areas‘ that 
exist in international law when dealing with mercenarism and its modern form. It is 
                                                 
4
 Private Security Companies or Contractors (PSCs), Private Military Companies/contractors (PMCs), 
Private Military Firms (PMFs) and recently, Private Military and Security Company/contractors 
(PMSCs). This naming process has gone through various revisions and is commonly used in several 
forms. Ostensibly they are all talking about the same entities and so I shall not belabour the subtle 
interpretive differences that may exist between them and instead use these various acronyms where 
appropriate. 
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the existence of these loopholes, ambiguities and interpretive grey areas that creates 
such difficulty in controlling or even defining the industry.  
 
A key feature in the history of the emergence of the contemporary privatise military 
contractor has been the pursuit of legitimacy in the legal sense, as well as politically 
and morally. While this is a philosophical dissertation, specifically concerned with an 
ethical evaluation, the topic requires a multidisciplinary approach in the face of 
interconnected political, legal and economic factors. As a result, an exploration of the 
rise of the PMI, from its roots in historical mercenarism, will also touch on these 
elements. 
 
History of the Mercenarism 
Mercenaries 
The Private Military Industry is the modern iteration of an age-old response to a 
particular need. As soon as specialised soldiers began to appear on ancient 
battlefields, the market for soldiers-for-hire was born. Men trained and employed 
specifically to fight were naturally more effective than armies conscripted from the 
civilian population, a fact reinforced as the complexity of war increased. The 
downside to a specialised ‗professional‘ army was that it was more expensive to raise 
and maintain, not to mention a source of various political risks such as that posed to 
internal security by training a potentially rebellious populace in the finer points of 
warfare (a point raised prominently in O‘Keefe 2008, pp. 12 –14]).
5
 As dedicated 
military forces were not always feasible, mercenarism provided trained, specialised 
troops to needy masters, and also provided these professional soldiers (now in the 
most literal sense) a regular source of income. With this relationship between supply 
and demand of specific martial skills established, it is arguable that a private military 





                                                 
5
 Ironically, this logic was employed during the 1994 post-apartheid election in South Africa where 
ANC officials allowed for PMI recruitment of former SADF personnel with the justification that it 
would ―remove personnel  which might have a destabilising effect on the forthcoming multiracial 
election.‖ (Pech 1997, p.8) 
6
 Deborah Avant promotes this concept in a study of the contemporary industry:  Market for Force 
(2005).  
 11 
Among the first historical references to mercenarism and the use of mercenaries come 
from the ancient Egyptians, where for instance the New Kingdom of Egypt made use 
of mercenaries in its new model army.
7
 In the classic era, Xerxes himself used Greek 
mercenaries at the time of Thermopylae while Darius the Third paid to have Greek 
soldiers in his ranks while facing Alexander the Great (who likewise employed 
mercenary troops). Persian use of mercenaries was particularly noteworthy and 
included the famous Xenophon (Mieroop 2006. pp. 270-271). Mercenaries featured in 
the Punic wars on both the Carthaginian and Roman sides, and later, barbarians began 
to serve an increasingly prominent role in the Roman Empire as swords-for-hire. The 
Varangian Guard served as one of the best-known mercenary forces to the Byzantine 
Empire (incidentally, over a quarter of the defenders present at the fall of 
Constantinople in 1453 were mercenaries [Runciman, 1990 pp. 86-88]). Throughout 
the medieval period and into the later Middle Ages, individual mercenaries such as El 
Cid, as well as larger established groups such as the famed Genoese crossbowmen and 
the early Swiss Mercenary Pikemen played roles in major European conflicts. This 
further developed into (often quite complex) formal arrangements such as those that 
existed between the condottieri and the Italian city-states from the Middle Ages into 
the 16
th
 Century, and Free Companies such as the Catalan Company and the White 
Company commanded by Sir John Harkwood.
8
 It should be noted at this point that 
these organised companies often effectively became bands of raiders and brigands 
when not employed. They may have maintained a cohesive organisational structure, 
but they also were not at all hesitant to find other means of enrichment – not that this 
was unique to mercenaries. The Middle Ages aren‘t generally considered to be a 
particularly law-abiding period, especially for soldiers. In many ways, these 
mercenary bands fell somewhere between extortionists and privateers. They were also 






 and early 19th centuries, mercenaries continued to play a role in 
European military affairs, from the original Wild Geese (banished Irish soldiers 
serving in European armies following the 1681 Treaty of Limerick) to the extensive 
                                                 
7




 Harkwood is the subject of an in depth history in (Scott 1889). 
 12 
use of mercenaries by all sides during the Napoleonic Wars.
9
 Mercenaries were also 
very active in colonial settings – from the Hessians used by the British during the 
American War of Independence (Bergner 2005, p. 2), to a string of European 
adventurer-soldiers such as Henry Ronal Douglas McIver, who served in Asia, the 
Americas, Europe and Africa.
10
 It is interesting to note that the large organised bodies 
of mercenaries dwindled in the early 19
th
 Century. It is arguable that this was partly a 
result of the settling of Europe into relative peace, which reduced the market for 
mercenaries. It was also a period in which the notion of sovereign rule as advocated in 
the treaty of Westphalia in 1648
11
 began to gain prominence, allowing for the 
establishment of more advanced inter-state politics and increased prominence of the 
‗citizen army‘ (Percy 2007, pp. 121-122), which made Europe a less fertile ground for 
mercenary activity of the traditional sort from previous centuries.  
 
Outside of Europe, the 19
th
 century saw an interesting range of mercenary activity, 
from the individual men of fortune who made names for themselves in China and 
across Africa, to the government-allied men involved in Cecil Rhodes‘ British South 
Africa Company (BSAC) and the famous Flying Tigers who fought for Chiang Kai-
shek against the Japanese prior to the US entry into WWII. The British South Africa 
Police served as a private army of sorts for the BSAC in the First and Second 
Matabela Wars and continued to exist as a part of Rhodesia (which was afforded 
colony status in 1923 eventually becoming Zimbabwe).
12
 Until 1923, members of the 
BSAP were paid by the company as mercenaries.  
 
Before the United States became involved in the Second World War, US airmen were 
granted a leave of absence by the USAAF to join the American Volunteer Group, set 
up by the Roosevelt government to assist China, and were paid not only service wages 
but also bounties by a Chinese company serving as a front for the Chinese 
                                                 
9
 See Napoleon‟s Mercenaries by Guy Dempsey (2002) for an exhaustive study of foreign troops 
serving in the French Grand Armée. 
10
 McIver is the subject of a biography: (Davis, 1906). 
11
 Treaty of Westphalia (1648). The Avalon Project. Yale Law School. 
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/westphal.htm 
12
 Taken from the BSAC background provided by the British South African Police Abbreviated 




 The notion of bounty is synonymous with the traditional idea of 
mercenarism. Typically, a mercenary was a specialised, highly trained soldier and 
would thus receive pay commensurate with his specific talents. In the case of 
mercenaries being defined merely as soldiers for hire working in the service of a state 
not their own, their pay might not have been any different to that received by regular 
soldiers. That being said, it was often the case that mercenaries were able, if not 
encouraged, to enrich themselves through looting, bounties and other forms of 
brigandry. This trend, while generally outlawed as time progressed in Europe, 
continued and flourished in other arenas in later years and is especially notable in the 
actions of mercenaries serving in post-colonial Africa.
14
 The forms of payment that 
mercenaries enjoyed were major contributing factors to the poor moral reputation that 
is ascribed to traditional mercenaries.  
 
Post-Colonial Mercenarism 
Following World War Two, post-colonial Africa provided the ideal weakened-state 
political terrain in which mercenarism could flourish. It is here that men like ‗Mad 
Mike‘ Hoare, ‗Black Jack‘ Schramme, the infamous ‗Colonel Calan‘ and Bob Denard 
cut a swathe through the African landscape (Bruce 2002) – creating an immortal 
romance with the image of the mercenary in the West, and a brutal reputation of terror 
in Africa. This disparity in perceptions remains today. Popular culture embraced an 
image of the mercenary, which it developed and romanticised with films and books 
like The Wild Geese (1985 film), Dogs of War (the 1974 Frederick Forsythe book, and 
the 1981 movie based on it) and Dark of the Sun (a 1965 Wilbur Smith novel turned 
into a movie in 1968).
15
 The same kinds of general brigandry that existed in Europe 
during the hey-day of the Free Companies were revisited here as these men found 
themselves stronger and better armed than many of the states in which they operated. 
                                                 
13
 Retrieved from the U.S. Centennial Flight Commission, from an article entitled ―Claire Chennault 
and the Flying Tigers of World War II‖ compiled by P. Feltus assumedly in 2003. 
http://www.centennialofflight.gov/essay/Air_Power/tigers/AP24.htm 
Last accessed 21-08-08. 
14
 A practise mentioned repeatedly by Jerry Puren in the biographical book Mercenary Commander, 
written by Brian Pottinger (1986). 
15
 These books and movies have remarkable links to the realities of the mercenary activity they 
portrayed. Wild Geese was based on the similarly named Wild Geese commanded by Mike Hoare 
during the Congo Crisis and he was persuaded to join in the production as a technical advisor. Dogs of 
War was lent a peculiar degree of authenticity as a result of Forsyth‘s ‗research‘ which allegedly 
involved planning a real coup. Dark of the Sun is based in the context of the Congo Crisis and a 
mission to rescue Belgian citizens caught up in the chaos. It features a ruthless German character who 
was based on a real mercenary, one Siegfried ―Kongo‖ Mueller, who took part in the Crisis.  
 14 
The chaos of the Congo Crisis saw mercenaries fighting for all sides in the confused 
conflict
16
. At stages in this conflict mercenaries actually fought against the United 
Nations peacekeeping forces sent to the region, which undoubtedly contributed to the 
historically negative perception of mercenarism held by the UN.
17
 These notable 
individuals and their semi-formalised ‗units‘ of men in turn gave way to (more 
corporately structured) companies like Executive Outcomes who operated in Angola 
in the 1990s and most famously, in Sierra Leone in 1994. It is with Executive 
Outcomes that many people consider the beginning of the PMI – the rise of the first 
Private Military Company (Bergner 2005 p. 3). 
 
Rise of the PMI
18
 
A quick examination of the history of Executive Outcomes
19
 reveals much about the 
development of the Private Military Industry. Following the end of the Apartheid 
regime, the South African Defence Force
20
 began dismantling its special operations 
units, including 32 Battalion, the infamous ‗Koevoet‘, as well as the Special Forces 
Brigade and the somewhat sinister Civil Cooperation Bureau of which Eeben Barlow, 
EO‘s founder, was formerly a part. Barlow began a process of recruitment from these 
units and soon established a comprehensive roster of highly trained, highly 
experienced individuals. EO offered protection services specifically to resource 
extraction operations (mining in particular) in conflict states. It is commonly alleged 
that mining concessions featured prominently in EO‘s payment – a matter disputed by 
its founder in his autobiography (Barlow 2007, pp. 356, 367, 372, 380, 531). The 
notion of mercenaries ‗plundering‘ a region and its natural resources is a pervasive 
image that has carried over from ancient mercenarism, to the post-colonial 
mercenaries and the PMI. Aside from training troops in several states, EO was 
involved in operations in Angola and most famously, Sierra Leone. Here, they took 
the place of the departing Ghurkha Security Guards and were instrumental in driving 
                                                 
16
 See Bloomfield and Moulton (1999) at http://web.mit.edu/cascon/cases/case_con.html for an 
overview. 
17
 Again described in first person detail by Jerry Puren in (Pottinger 1986, pp. 32, 56-57, 82-86). 
18
 Chapter title inspired by Singer‘s Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Private Military Industry 
(2003)). 
19
 I rely heavily here on Eeben Barlow‘s 2007 Executive Outcomes – Against All Odds. Much of the 
information relating to the establishment of EO, and it‘s subsequent activities are clouded by 
misinformation and confused journalism. My reliance on Barlow‘s text simply offers a single clear 
perspective on EO. 
20
 Now the South African National Defence Force. 
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back the Revolutionary United Front rebels (Barlow 2007 pp. 318-320). It is this case 
that is commonly brought up on the side of the PMI in arguing the benefit of 





Executive Outcomes shut down in 1999. It is commonly believed that this was a result 
of the introduction of the 1998 Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Act enacted 
by the South African Government to curb mercenary activities, not to mention the 
extensive ‗bad press‘ that the company was receiving. Barlow denies this, pointing 
out that, at the time, the company still had a government-issued license to continue 
with its work. Instead he claims there was a conflict of interest within the company. 
(Barlow 2007, pp. 517) While the Act itself was not necessarily enough to prevent 
mercenary activity, particularly under the guise of Private Contractors, the company 
itself had become too prominent to hide under the radar. Several companies emerged 
to take the place of Executive Outcomes, including Sandline International which, 
through founder Tim Spicer, an alleged associate of Barlow and EO, continued to 
push the shift in public perception around Private Military Companies in contrast to 
traditional mercenaries (Scahill 2007, p. 362) including the publication of ‗white 
papers‘ promoting the peacekeeping possibilities offered by the PMI.
22
 Sandline was 
also embroiled in several controversial events including the 1998 ‗Sandline Affair‘.
23
 
Sandline closed in 2004 and many of its personnel (including Tim Spicer) moved over 
to Aegis Defence Services (ICIJ 2002), which has in turn suffered a degree of scandal 
in the recent past, including the discovery of ‗trophy videos‘ taken by contractors, 





The most prominent name in the Private Military Industry at the moment is 
Blackwater Worldwide – the eponymous example of the multifaceted, government 
                                                 
21
 Sierra Leone is the subject of much study from all sides in the PMI debate. For a particularly in depth 




 Detailed in an article titled ―The PNGDF in Troubled Times‖ which appeared in The Asia-Pacific 
Magazine in 1997. Accessed 21-08-2008 at http://epress.anu.edu.au/sspng/mobile_devices/ch10.html. 
24
‗Trophy videos exposes private security contractors shooting up Iraqi drivers‘ - Rayment, S. Daily 
Telegraph. November 25
th




connected, corporate modelled Private Military and Security Company. At the time of 
writing this, I would contend that Blackwater (Worldwide) is the evolutionarily 
pinnacle of the contemporary PMSC. It is for the time being economically secure in 
its dealings through a myriad of government level policies brought about through 
careful political manoeuvring which in turn lends political and legal security.
25
 
Blackwater has been involved in American activities in the Global War on Terror in 
both Afghanistan and Iraq, offering multiple services, from Protective Services Detail 
(PSD)
26
 to the training and provision of masses of security guards. Blackwater is best 
known for it presence in Iraq, gaining prominence as L. Paul Bremer‘s bodyguards 
during his time as head of the Coalition Provisional Authority (Scahill 2007, pp. 61-
80) and later in the Fallujah killings (Scahill 2007, pp. 95-104), the Najaf firefight 
(Scahill 2007 pp. 122-120) and the Nisoor Square shooting (Glanz 2007). They have 
also been involved in Afghanistan, with security details and logistical support (Scahill 
2007, pp. 43-47) and the controversial ‗Blackwater 61‘ crash in November 2004 
(Scahill 2007, pp. 236-249). Blackwater was also highly visible in its employment as 
riot police (of a sort) in the aftermath of the Katrina disaster in New Orleans (Ibid pp 
321-332). On top of these functions, Blackwater retains its original role as a provider 
of high-level training to police and federal enforcement officers, and other branches 
of the US military and government.
27
 It has had its fair share of controversy but 
through the economic, legal and political security that it enjoys, it has been largely 




Private Military and Security Companies can be described as part of an evolution of 
mercenarism to encompass modern privatisation and corporate trends in an altered 
global political environment. In other words, the contemporary PMI entails the 
privatisation of (military) force on a corporate level, following a corporate model and 
corporate trends relating to business behaviour and practice as dictated by an evolved 
                                                 
25
 As with EO, much of the details relating to Blackwater are clouded by confused journalism. I rely 
heavily on Jeremy Scahill‘s exhaustively researched Blackwater – The Rise of the World‟s most 
powerful Mercenary Army (2007) as it offers an impressive level of filtered detail on the company. 
26
 Or alternatively, a Personal Security Detachment, depending on which branch of the armed forces 
you are from. 
27
 For an extremely in depth exploration of Blackwater, see (Scahill 2007). This description of the 
company‘s activities relies heavily on this book. 
28
 Transcript from a DemocracyNow! Newscast featuring Jeremy Scahill regarding the Nisoor 
shooting and its half-hearted investigation by the U.S. DOJ, aired October 2007. 
http://www.democracynow.org/2007/10/11/exclusive_family_members_of_slain_iraqis 
 17 
global political, economic and social environment. This set of new market 
environment factors is described in the introduction to Private Military and Security 
Companies – Ethics, Policies and Civil-military Relations (2008) as follows: 
 
In the developing world, the end of the bi-polar international order removed 
the incentive that the sole remaining great power had to gain influence over 
the rulers of small states by providing them with the resources they need to 
secure themselves against usurpation. Consequently, in fragile states, 
particularly in Africa, where governments possess only tenuous legitimacy and 
limited coercive power, state and non-state actors alike have been forced to 
look for other providers of security. Finally, the dissolution of a tight-knit 
international order of states has stimulated ‗new wars‘ involving non-state 
actors, such as religious or ethnic based organisations. (Alexander et al, 2008 
p.2) 
 
In a 2008 essay entitled Security: Intervention and Control, Herbert Wulf offered 
several causes and motives for outsourcing which appeal to the idea of a drastically 
changed global climate. Large numbers of qualified military personnel, in the sphere 
of modern war fighting and facing the intensified demand for armed forces in the ‗war 
on terror‘ as well as the demand created by weak or besieged governments has created 
a viable market for the PMI. Moreover, public opinion and increased media coverage 
has played a role in motivating against the use of ‗home troops.‘ (Wulf 2008, pp.193- 
194)   
 
 Peter W. Singer, considered to be a foremost authority on the rise of what he refers to 
as the ‗Corporate Warrior‘, coined a ‗tip of the spear‘ typology of the different 
iterations of PMCs to show the increased complexity of the Private Military Industry 
(Singer 2003, pp. 91-93). He established three categories: Military Support Firms, 
Military Consultancy Firms and Military Provider Firms. Getting past the corporate 
language, this refers to the logistical support, tactical and strategic resource 
consultancy and actual warfighter capabilities, respectively. In other words, PMCs 
can provide logistical support (as with Kellogg-Brown and Root), a consultancy 
function (as with Military Professional Resources Incorporated) and the more familiar 
fighting capacity (as offered by Executive Outcomes, Sandline, Aegis and the 
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ubiquitous Blackwater Worldwide). This increased complexity has served to create a 
‗grey‘ area in the definition of PMSCs that I will deal with in Chapter Two, which 
examines the debate on whether or not the PMI is significantly different to traditional 
mercenarism, and if this difference warrants an updated ethical appraisal. 
 
In this historical study of the development of the PMI, I have provided overviews of 
both Blackwater and Executive Outcomes to illustrate the evolving nature of the 
industry. Not only does the PMI differ greatly from ancient mercenarism, but also to 
the relatively recent post-colonial ‗Dogs of War‘ lack the corporate complexity 
exhibited by military contractors of the 1980‘s, 90‘s and more recently. Executive 
Outcomes is commonly described as ―the model on which all Private Military 
Companies operating in Iraq and Afghanistan are based‖ (Barlow 2007, Back Cover). 
Executive Outcomes was in many respects very similar to Blackwater, and yet there 
are differences. Different historical, developmental and environmental factors have a 
role to play here, but the single biggest difference between the two has to do with 
whom these companies are/were employed by. Herbert Wulf differentiates between 
two principally different types of privatisation of force. The first, he categorises as  
 
bottom-up privatisation, which could also be categorised as pre-modern, 
describes activities of non-state actors who use violence for their own political 
or economic gain. Usually, these actors operate without authorisation of state 
authorities or even against their explicit wishes, but occasionally 
representatives of the state system are accomplices. The police and military 
forces are too weak, too corrupt or unwilling to exercise the rule of law and 
the state monopoly of violence. (Wulf 2008, p. 192).  
 
The second type of privatisation he calls:  
 
top-down or post-modern privatisation, (which) is purposely planned and 
implemented by governments. The aim is to outsource traditional military and 
state functions to private companies. These companies offer a wide range of 
services: they provide not only logistics for armed forces on the battlefield, but 
also protection for non-state institutions such as international agencies and 
humanitarian organisations in post-conflict societies, for governments in their 
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fight against rebels or insurgents, as well as for multinational companies. 
(Wulf 2008, p. 192).  
 
Wulf‘s differentiation is quite easily applied to Blackwater – clearly falling under the 
classification of an example of post-modern privatisation, particularly with its strong, 
integrated relationship with the U.S. government that stems as much from its political 
origins, as its patriotic marketing campaign. Executive Outcomes is a little less easily 
classified. It‘s early contract in Angola providing security for the retrieval of 
equipment owned by Heritage Oil & Gas/Ranger Oil in Soyo in 1993 (Barlow 2007, 
pp 89-123) was conducted in conjunction with Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) which 
seems to give it similar characteristics to post-modern privatisation. But, in Angola 
(as with Sierra Leone), the state in question exhibited weak governance, and of course 
Executive Outcomes would go on to clash repeatedly with it‘s home country‘s 
wishes.
29
 While this kind of blurring of the lines hardly threatens Wulf‘s 
differentiation, it does hint at the role circumstance play in how a PMSC is perceived. 
EO found itself originating from a country with a especially negative outlook on 
mercenaries, and was forced to work for various masters as a result. Blackwater finds 
itself in partnership with a government that has historically welcomed outsourcing of 
military functions and has therefore been able to profit from, and seek protection 
behind this partnership. I raise this point to illustrate how difficult it is to clearly 
define aspects of the PMI, a problem which continues to hinder progress on the 
debate. 
 
Legalities of the Private Military Industry 
This section will briefly sketch the legal aspect of the PMI debate. This incorporates 
both national and international law. This is crucial, given the transnational nature of 
the industry. ‗Local‘ legal interpretations of the PMI or mercenarism is complicated 
by particular social and political biases and historical background, The problems that 
arise out of trying to apply International Law to the industry are numerous. Here, the 
confusion is both a matter of ambiguous and subjective legal definitions, and of 
                                                 
29
 A point repeatedly made by Barlow, relating the continual harassment EO faced from the South 
African government and especially its Military Intelligence branch.  
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attempting to extend these definitions on a global scale. States often reject or simply 




In international law the relevant bodies of legislation are directed at the distinctions 
between combatants, non-combatants and unlawful combatants; and in the treatment 
of mercenaries and mercenarism itself. The bodies of law that are important are 
therefore the 1949 Geneva Conventions Article 47 and the United Nations 1989 
Mercenary Convention
31
 respectively. The problem here is that the UN ‗Mercenary 
Convention,‘
32
 was a reaction to post-colonial mercenary activities, and many feel has 
not been updated to incorporate a changed global reality.
33
 With regards to the 
Geneva Conventions, the 1977 Additional Protocol,
34
 specifically relates to 
mercenaries in referring to them as civilians who take part in hostilities motivated by 
a desire for private gain. Within the Geneva Conventions mercenaries are considered 
unlawful combatants and therefore not afforded the POW status of lawful combatants. 
This then can be taken in conjunction with the UN perception of mercenaries as a 
source of instability and human suffering and therefore outlawed (a status that has 
been ratified on several occasions through Special Rapporteur mandates).
35
 This then 
forms the body of legislation which is designed to deal with mercenarism, but as Todd 
Milliard asserts, these perceptions and categorisations are outdated and preoccupied 
with the post-colonial iteration of mercenarism and is therefore unable to effectively 
and practically deal with the modern PMI. Milliard asserts that the UN ignores the 
thousands of years of ‗legitimate‘ mercenary use and instead focuses on the post-
colonial period. (Milliard 2003, p. 34)  
 
                                                 
30
 As is the case in the US rejection of the UN Report on mercenary activity. 
31
 International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries 
A/RES/44/34 72nd plenary meeting 4 December 1989 (UN Mercenary Convention) Entry into force: 
20 October 2001. 
32
 International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries 
A/RES/44/34 72nd plenary meeting 4 December 1989 (UN Mercenary Convention) Entry into force: 
20 October 2001. 
33
 Todd Milliard explores this topic in depth in Overcoming Post-Colonial Myopia: A call to recognise 
and regulate private military companies. (Milliard, 2003). 
34
 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of 




 I‘m referring hear to (Ballesteros, 2003) and (Shameem, 2005) – both ‗UN Special Rapporteur on the 
use of mercenaries as a means of violating humans rights and impeding the exercise of the right of 
peoples to self determination‘. 
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There is also the added confusion of subjective local interpretations of the PMI. 
African states are aligned with the UN in outright condemnation of the PMI through 
the OAU/AU.
36
 South Africa, for instance, has taken steps to update its legal 
framework in order to accommodate a modern interpretation of mercenarism, but has 
chosen an explicitly negative perception of the industry. In 1998 the South African 
Government enacted the Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Act. This was 
updated in The Prohibition of Mercenary Activities and Regulation of Certain 
Activities in Country of Armed Conflict Act, 2006 (Act No. 27, 2006), ratified 2007. 
This act is designed to close off all potential loopholes relating to South African 
citizens becoming involved in PMI activity. The heavy handed nature of this response 
is attributable to a knee-jerk reaction to political pressure and the historical legacy of 
mercenaries on the continent from the days of the ‗dogs of war‘ through to the 
heydays of Executive Outcomes, and is often criticised as overly crude and clumsy in 
its execution.
37
 At the same time, South Africa is still a major provider of men to the 





The United States occupies the opposite end of the spectrum. The U.S. has a historical 
relationship between private contractors and its military albeit mostly in a logistical 
capacity. This has changed dramatically in the past two decades and the United States 
now officially incorporates the PMI into its foreign policy (ICAF 2006). It is notable 
that the US did not sign the 1989 UN ‗Merc Convention‘, nor was it a party to the 
1977 Additional Protocol. In Iraq, for instance, one of Paul Bremner‘s final acts as 
head of reconstruction was to enact CPA Order 17 which effectively gave contractors 
associated with the Coalition Provisional Authority or the US, immunity from Iraqi 
Law.
39
 This immunity extended from traffic violations (illegal driving is a typical 
facet of Private Security Detail operations for instance) to the use of lethal force. The 
full extent of this immunity was tested in 2007 by Blackwater Worldwide operatives 
                                                 
36
 In the form of the OAU Mercenary Convention (1977 – OUA Convention for the Elimination of 
Mercenarism in Africa). 
37
 This was a comment made by several members of the Industrial College of Armed Forces study 
group visiting South Africa in 2007, particularly at a seminar at the Institute of Strategic Studies. 
38
‗ Privatised War: The South African Connection‘, an article published on Znet by Andy Clarno and 
Salim Vally in 2005 mentions a UN Report which, at the time put South Africa in the top 3 providers 
of manpower to the PMI. http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/6742 
39
 Jeremy Scahill (2007) makes specific reference to this moment as a crucial step in the massive 
expansion in the PMI. 
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in what is now known as the Nisoor Square shootings.
40
 A Blackwater convoy was 
escorting a VIP when it opened fire resulting in the deaths of several Iraqi civilians. 
The cause and nature of the shooting is in dispute, as are the casualty figures as well 
as several other aspects of the event (Singer 2008, p. 1). Regardless, Blackwater 
contractors are (for the time being) immune from Iraqi prosecution and will not face 
an Iraqi court. Instead they are technically subject to prosecution by US courts 
(formalised by a 2007 U.S. House Bill which confirmed private contractors to be 
subjective to US law). This was to be conducted as part of the Uniform Code of 
Military Justice, but as of 2006 the specifics of the UCMJ relating to contractors 
changed such that the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA)
41
 then became 
the relevant legal body of prosecution. Even then, this is difficult to implement as the 
legal structures in place require a clear chain of evidence which is likely to be 
impossible considering that a U.S. Court would almost inevitably find evidence 
produced by Iraqi investigators to be inadmissible. (Singer 2008, p. 12) At present, 
there is very little legal recourse available for the purposes of regulating the PMI.  
 
Clearly the UN has a strongly set opinion of mercenarism and of the PMI but at the 
same time, this inflexible stance has led to a ‗grey area‘ which the United States, for 
example, has exacerbated by its rejection of international law regarding 
mercenarism.
42
 This has collectively contributed to the overall rise and establishment 




The historical origins of mercenarism reveals the evolutionary process that has 
occurred, arriving at the modern PMI. Ancient mercenaries have given way to the 
post-colonial ‗dogs of war‘, which has dominated the modern perception of 
mercenarism. The rise of the PMI through the likes of Executive Outcomes and 
Blackwater Worldwide, has created a rift between this notion of post-colonial 
mercenarism, and the contemporary industry. This rift manifests in the ambiguous 
                                                 
40




 Higgins, A (2007). ―US rejects UN mercenary report‖ USA Today  
www.usatoday.com/news/world/2007-10-17-3392316246_x.htm Accessed 24-06-08. 
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legal treatment of the subject at both the domestic and international levels. At its core, 
the legal debate revolves around the issue of defining (or redefining) precisely what a 
‗mercenary‘ is. Without this definition, a regulatory framework is impossible to 
implement. This is a major hurdle for the industry, and therefore, to the proposal of 
privatised peacekeeping. The question raised from this, is why this issue of arriving at 
a definition is so complicated. This is approached in the form of an ethical evaluation 
in the next chapter. 
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Chapter Two 
The Ethics of Privatising Control of Force 
 
Introduction 
In this chapter I give an overview and evaluation of the main ethical arguments that 
have been raised regarding the rise of the PMI. There are several main strands of 
argument here, covering various often-interlinked areas of debate. The purpose of this 
chapter is to establish the ethical terrain of the PMI and mercenarism debate in order 
to move into the question of the ethicality of privatised peacekeeping. 
 
One major strand of argument revolves around the question of mercenary morality. 
Are mercenaries intrinsically immoral individuals? Is their morality inherently 
attached to the ethicality of their actions and concordantly, is the very concept of 
mercenarism immoral by definition? These are essentially deontological questions. 
Another strand of argument focuses on whether the modern PMI should be defined in 
the traditional terms of ‗mercenarism‘. Is there a difference, and does this difference 
warrant a different ethical perspective on the Private Military Industry? This leads to 
questions of justifiable privatisation of force, which is pertinent to the overall 
consequentialist aspect of this dissertation. 
 
Defining the PMI in relation to traditional mercenarism highlights a potential trend: 
Even if mercenarism can be declared intrinsically immoral, perhaps the PMI can 
claim some mitigating moral legitimacy in its contemporary format. And from that, 
perhaps Privatised Peacekeeping can, in turn, lay claim to ethical justification. If 
nothing else, exploration of the beginnings of this potential slippery slope to 
legitimacy will establish some useful focal points and criteria with which to evaluate 
the notion of privatised peace support.  
 
There is also a consequentialist argument that covers both traditional mercenarism 
and the PMI. It judges the privatisation of force along prudential lines, specifically in 
terms of its effect on the state. Thomas More described his ―wise Utopians‖
43
 utilising 
mercenaries as the most effective step in directing risk away from the state‘s 
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 Coady mentions this in ―Mercenary Morality‖.  He refers to More, T. (1972).Utopia. Penguin, 
Harmondsworth. P. 112. 
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populace. Machiavelli felt the opposite, that mercenaries were poor soldiers, a danger 
to their employer and ultimately a danger to the moral character of the state itself.
44
 
Much work has been generated by these charges. This argument tends to involve 
concern over the state‘s monopoly over the control of force as part of the civil-
military relations framework.  
 
The ethical debate around mercenarism and the PMI is broken down in this chapter as 
follows: First, a range of deontological arguments concerned with the intrinsic 
morality of mercenaries and mercenarism that revolves around motive and 
justification. Second, a series of efforts at differentiation between traditional 
mercenarism and the modern PMI, which appears to attempt to circumvent 
deontological concerns about mercenarism with utilitarian justifications for its 
existence and increasingly sophisticated appeals to notions of globalisation and 
privatisation trends, and corporatisation and the CSR that goes with it.  And finally, a 
range of consequentialist arguments that overlap the PMI vs. mercenarism debate, and 
examine the effects of privatisation of force on systems of civil-military relations. 
 
Mercenary morality 
In the introduction to Private Military and Security Companies (Alexandra et al 
2008), Andrew Alexandra, Deane-Peter Baker and Marina Caparini note that, despite 
the lively debate on the topic of the ethics of war that has taken place since the 
publication of Michael Walzer‘s Just and Unjust Wars, there has been strikingly little 
said about the ethics of mercenary participation in conflict, but rather a ―tendency to 
accept the popular and legal assessment of mercenaries as morally reprehensible, if 
not completely unacceptable.‖ (Alexandra et al 2008, p. 3). Anthony Coady examined 
this topic back in 1992 in the aptly titled paper Mercenary Morality (Coady 1992). 
Here he posed questions relating to the moral nature of mercenaries and their 
motivations and of the concept of mercenarism itself, drawing from and targeting 
writing on the topic by Niccolo Machiavelli which, as many writers contend today, 
tended to erroneously criticise Italian Condottieri. Machiavelli‘s fundamental 
argument against mercenaries is described by Baker as threefold (Baker 2008, p. 33): 
                                                 
44
 Machiavelli, N, The Prince (2005), ch. Xii: 
http://www.constitution.org/mac/prince12.htm (Accessed 17-08-08) 
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That mercenaries are not sufficiently bloodthirsty; that mercenaries cannot be trusted 
because of the temptations of political power, and that there exists some motive or 
motives appropriate to engaging in war that mercenaries necessarily lack, or else are 
motivated by some factor that is inappropriate to engaging in war. 
 
The first two arguments are easy enough to deal with, as Baker does in Of 
„mercenaries‟ and prostitutes (Baker 2008). The first: that mercenaries display 
insufficient bloodthirstiness, is considered a false assertion stemming from 
Machiavelli‘s experience of Italian Condottiere. As Baker points out, this hardly 
constitutes a moral transgression either (other than perhaps lending itself to some sort 
of caveat emptor for the industry). The second argument is likewise untenable – there 
is no reason to believe that mercenaries are any more or less likely to be tempted by 
political power. The final argument however, points to the question of sufficient 
motive, and provides an area for serious ethical enquiry. Tony Lynch and A.J. Walsh 
tackled this topic in their paper The Good Mercenary in 2002.  In this article they 
adopted what they referred to as a position of ‗anti-anti-mercenarism‘, rather than 
either promoting or defending mercenarism itself. Walsh and Lynch approached 
questions of justification and motivation as a major theme of the debate. This is a 
commonly raised argument about the intrinsic immorality of mercenarism in that it is 
fundamentally motivated by monetary or material gain, which is seen as insufficient 
cause for violence from even a non-pacifist perspective which might advocate self 
defence or other iterations of Just War Theory.
45
 In dealing with this question, Walsh 
and Lynch pointed out that the notions of ‗just cause‘ or ‗right intention‘ seemed to be 
idealistically set out to presuppose such things are necessarily only attainable by 
statist institutions. (Lynch and Walsh 2002, pp. 139-140) In addition, they took a 
similar line of argument as Coady in pointing out that the notion of mercenaries 
functioning purely as ‗lucrepaths‘
46
 need not necessarily be true. In fact, both articles 
argue that the idea of a ‗just mercenary‘ is in no way illogical or inconceivable (Baker 
2008, p. 41).  
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 See Joseph Runzo, Benevolence, Honourable Soldiers and Private Military Companies – 
Reformulating Just War Theory, in Alexander et al (2008), for an examination of Just War Theory. 
Here, Runzo tries to incorporate the PMI phenomenon, along with other factors in contemporary 
warfare including terrorism and humanitarian intervention into the evolving ethics of modern warfare. I 
will return to this in later chapters. 
46




Lynch and Walsh also targeted several other typical anti-mercenary arguments 
including prudential concerns such as those raised by Machiavelli about the efficiency 
and trustworthiness of mercenaries, not to mention the effect that mercenarism would 
have on the state institution. This constitutes a bridge between their examination of 
anti-mercenarism arguments based on supposed intrinsic immorality, and 
consequentialist arguments relating to the matter. In examining ―undesirable 
ramifications of the martial profit nexus‖ (Lynch and Walsh 2002, p. 143) they 
dismiss many of the arguments raised by Machiavelli about the suitability of 
mercenaries, in a similar manner to Baker, and going as far as to offer a ‗hidden hand‘ 
aspect of mercenarism which shows that mercenaries could very well have less killing 
motive than state-controlled forces, and as such ultimately the ―moral economy of a 
mercenarist world would appear to be preferable to that of the Statist societies we 
currently inhabit‖ (Lynch and Walsh 2002, p. 53).   
 
Mercenaries or Private Military Contractors? 
Both Coady, and Lynch and Walsh, consider the traditional notion of mercenarism 
and the modern form taken by the PMI. There are certainly differences in appearance, 
but how substantial is this difference in reality and is the difference between the two 
relevant, ethically speaking? Uwe Steinhoff approaches this question in an essay in 
which he attempts to answer the question: What is a mercenary? (Steinhoff 2008) He 
concludes that morally speaking; modern PMI actors are cut from the same cloth as 
ancient mercenaries. Deane-Peter Baker describes PMSCs as ―the mercenary band‘s 
more sophisticated cousin‖ (Baker 2008, p.30) but Steinhoff argues that the 
differences between classical mercenarism and the modern PMI has been exaggerated 
(Steinhoff 2008, p. 20). Steinhoff targets a definition of the mercenary offered by 
Francois Hampson
47
 which he notes is typical of the standard definition of a 
mercenary and moreover, corresponds ―more or less to the one given by Article 47 of 
the 1977 Additional Protocols to the Geneva Convention.‖ (Steinhoff 2008, p. 20) By 
this definition mercenaries are taken to have three essential characteristics: ―They are 
foreign, motivated principally by financial gain and use force, but not as regulars of 
the armed forces of a State.‖ (Steinhoff 2008, p. 20). In his exploration of this typical 
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 Steinhoff refers to Hampson‘s definition of mercenarism, coming from Hampson, F.:  ―Mercenaries: 
Diagnosis Before Proscription‖.  Netherlands Yearbook of International Law, 1991, Vol. 2, pp 5f. 
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definition of a mercenary, Steinhoff systematically refutes each criterion of the 
Hampson definition. He begins with: 
 
The first element distinguishes mercenaries from members of the indigenous 
population who may take up arms for reasons of monetary gain. (Steinhoff 
2008, p. 20). 
 
Here, Steinhoff takes issue with both the stipulation of ‗indigenous populations‘ and 
the ‗monetary gain‘ aspect. Calling on empirical support of his doubts about the term 
‗indigenous‘, he shows that the stipulation of ‗indigenous‘ is ambiguous to the point 
of uselessness (Steinhoff 2008, p.  21 – specifically footnote 8). In terms of his doubts 
about the issue of ‗monetary gain‘ as a defining motive, he is supported by accounts 
from actual mercenaries describing their motives, as well as the logical arguments 
against lucrepathic mercenaries raised by Coady, Lynch and Walsh, and Baker.  
 
This theme of motive brings us to another morally relevant distinction in the 
Hampson definition:  
 
The second characteristic would exclude volunteers who fought for 
ideological reasons or out of a sense of adventure. (Steinhoff 2008, p. 20) 
 
Here, Steinhoff calls on more empirical support to show that, for instance, 
mercenaries like Count von Rosen were ―so selective about the wars they fight in that 
they can hardly be distinguished from ideologically motivated volunteers.‖ (Steinhoff 
2008, p. 22) Steinhoff concludes that this aspect of the Hampson criteria is also 
insufficient.  
 
In addition, he criticises the final element of the Hampson criteria:  
 
The final element distinguishes mercenaries from the armed forces of a State 
involved in a conflict within another State and from foreigners serving as an 
integral part of the armed forces of a State, such as the French Foreign Legion 
and the Ghurkha regiments in the British army. It also excludes individuals 
 29 
who train or advise the armed forces of a State, on condition that they do not 
themselves use force. (Steinhoff 2008, p. 20) 
 
Steinhoff deals with this final element in two parts. First, he questions the definition 
of force, which, in a sense, hints toward the typology of services in the PMI 
introduced by Peter W. Singer. Steinhoff‘s argument is that outright hostile action is 
not a necessary requirement to be considered a mercenary, and specifically that  
 
It is sufficient to sell the service of taking part in the hostilities and to be ready 
to take part in the hostilities. (Steinhoff 2008, p. 24) 
 
It is unclear here if he specifically considers the provision of martial support functions 
to be the same as actually taking part in violence. This then would reduce the 
logistical support and training aspects of Singer‘s typology to merely complicated 
iterations in the same spirit of mercenarism which is certainly in line with Steinhoff‘s 
argument against Singer‘s opinion of the PMI for the remainder of What are 
mercenaries?. In dealing with the first half of Hampson‘s final element, Steinhoff sets 
up this attack further by noting that the exclusion of entities like the Ghurkas or the 
French Foreign Legion opens up a loophole in the definition of a mercenary. 
Executive Outcomes employees were simply granted official employment in the 
Papua-New Guinea state forces, which rendered them technical legitimacy according 
to the Article 47 definition (Steinhoff 2008, p. 24), Steinhoff asks how this act (or 
trick as he can‘t resist suggesting) can transform mercenaries into regular soldiers and 
in particular, where the moral significance lies in such a transformation. 
 
Peter W. Singer has already been mentioned in this dissertation for his work in 
developing a comprehensive picture of the PMI. Steinhoff targets Singer‘s assertion 
that the PMI is in fact a different phenomenon to classical mercenarism. Steinhoff 
describes and then argues against several differences that Singer lists. Basically, 
Singer‘s argument is that the corporate nature of the industry creates specific and 
unique characteristics which traditional mercenarism cannot match. For instance, he 
argues that:  
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Several distinguishing characteristics follow from this corporatization … 
PMFs
48
 are ordered along pre-existing corporate lines, usually with a clear 
executive hierarchy that includes board of directors and share-holdings. This 
creates a tested, efficient, and more permanent structure that can compete and 




Steinhoff asserts that these differences are exaggerated, that PMSCs have no claim to 
superior efficiency and permanence nor does the implication of a business profit 
motive separate it from the individual profit motives that drove classical mercenaries. 
It can be argued that Steinhoff is too hurried in his dismissal here, that he focuses on 
the profit motive aspect of corporatization without paying suitable attention to the 
other accoutrements of the ‗corporate lines‘ described by Singer. Certainly, the 
elements of Corporate Social Responsibility and internal and external regulation are 
hinted at here. Christopher Kinsey pays particular attention to this theme in Private 
security companies and corporate social responsibility (Kinsey 2008, pp.  71-86), 
which I will look at later in this chapter. 
 
Steinhoff‘s search for a definition of a mercenary that takes into account the PMI and 
modern global trends reveals a great deal about this particular area of debate and 
shows how the failure to provide a clear, robust and modern definition – one which 
does not fall back into ‗traditional‘ responses to mercenarism – has resulted in much 
of the political and legal confusion on the topic.  
 
Civil-Military Relations and the Control of Force 
A consequentialist, rather than deontological approach to the question of mercenary 
morality results in questions about justification and legitimacy in a prudential sense, 
questions which emphasise the consequences of the use of mercenaries. One of the 
benefits of this approach is that it is able to better encompass contemporary aspects of 
the PMI, both in terms of its nature, and of the nature of the environment in which it 
exists. Moreover, this approach allows for a potential escape from the debate around 
differentiating between the PMI and mercenarism. 
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 Steinhoff, in Alexandra et al (2008), p. 25. A quote that he has taken from Singer‘s, War, Profits and 
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This consequentialist stream of argument hinges on Civil-Military relations and 
specifically, on the concept of the state‘s monopoly over the control of force. 
Machiavelli‘s theme of moral decay is carried through to the modern PMI by writers 
like Deborah Avant, who place particular emphasis on the effects of the private 
control of force on political stability.
50
 Max Weber incorporated the monopoly over 
the control of force into his very definition of a state, (Weber 1964) something that 
the privatisation of force therefore appears to threaten by definition. Michelle Small 
(2006) makes this argument, voicing a concern that the PMI erodes the legitimacy of 
the state, even while it may, at the same time, be temporarily propping up a weak state 
(as in Africa), or streamlining a strong state‘s functions (as in the case of US). She 
goes on to conclude that the continued existence of the PMI serves to ―forever alter 
the social fabric of the state, regardless of the numerous benefits and advantages that 
they may bring.‖ (Small 2006, p. 28) 
 
However, it is not necessarily the case that the very existence of privatised force 
threatens the integrity of the state. There is the argument to be made that this 
definition of the state, with its Westphalian notions of sovereignty, Hobbesian Social 
Contract thinking and the Weberian definition of the state, is in fact outdated, and that 
the relationship they extol has no place in the modern world. This modern globalised 
political environment, described by Herbert Wulf, complicates the debate further: 
 
Globalisation and the ensuing erosion of the nation-state are a fundamental 
challenge to the efficacy of the state-oriented monopoly of force inasmuch as 
globalisation leads to de-nationalisation and promotes the relocation of 
authority, from the nation-state to supranational actors. (Wulf 2008, p. 196).   
 
This seems to take the debate back in the direction of a multilateral organisation like 
the UN, which is certainly no healthier to the PMI than Small‘s argument against 
privatisation of force. On the other hand, it does show how the notion of democratic 
control of force has been obscured to the point where it can survive the tautological 
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type of argument raised against privatisation (as fundamentally undermining the 
Weberian conception of state). 
 
There is also evidence in the conduct of the United States to support the idea that 
outsourcing security functions traditionally ascribed to the state, need not necessarily 
concern the average citizen.
51
 This argument, as raised by Frost, seems specifically to 
relate to strong systems of democratic control of force, but what of the weakened state 
in the African context? There the question of democratic control is more a case of 
failed governance than the fault of the PMI – democratic control of force is simply not 
an option at that point. Frost goes on to argue that: 
 
What matters is that the private company being used must be understood by 
me, the citizen, as being subject to the laws and regulations laid down by my 
legitimate (because properly elected) government, and must be seen as 
carrying out the tasks set by it. (Frost 2008, p. 49) 
 
The question of the risk associated with the use of PMSCs, either by weak states or in 
the manner of the United States, to systems of control of force, is the source of much 
debate, particularly in the realm of International Relations. James Pattison refers to 
this first stream of argument as part of the intrinsic reasoning behind civil-military 
relations. There are also other streams of argument, which he refers to as instrumental 
(Pattison 2007), raised within the context of civil-military relations, which bear 
relevance to this discussion. 
 
In Outsourcing the Responsibility to Protect (2007), James Pattison points to a lack of 
democratic accountability as a weak point in the use of PMSCs in humanitarian 
intervention. Pattison‘s concern revolves around two issues. First, that PMSCs allow 
governments to circumvent many of the constraints on the decision to employ force. 
In terms of separation of powers, the democratic system provides oversight on the use 
of force by a government. Pattison offers the example of the US allegedly employing 
PMSCs to conduct covert operations in Somalia as a possible way in which a 
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government might use private actors to pursue international agendas without incurring 
the political penalties that might arise out of such a move. (Pattison 2007, p. 19) 
 
Pattison‘s second reason concerns the control over how force is actually employed 
during an intervention. This concern revolves around the idea that lines of command 
and control become blurred by the client-contractor relationship. Pattison calls on 
Singer, who describes risks common to all forms of outsourcing, namely the incentive 
for hired firms to ―overcharge, pad their personnel lists, hide failure, not perform to 
their peak capacity, and so on.‖ (Singer 2003b, p. 1) Singer does make the point that 
this is particularly worrying in the context of the security realm. Arguably however, 
this is no different to the outsourcing of, say, healthcare services – at least in terms of 
risks to people‘s lives. Regardless of whether that is true, this point by Singer (and 
Pattison) regarding democratic accountability is problematic to the industry.  
 
Jessica Wolfendale builds on the theme of the democratic control of force, and warns 
that something morally valuable in this system would be lost, if the relationship 
between the military and the community were to be compromised by the use of 
PMSCs. She warns that: 
 
If we treat private military companies as morally equivalent to national 
military forces, we fail to recognise the emotional, political and symbolic 
importance of the literal and symbolic relationship between national military 
forces and the community (Wolfendale 2008, p. 231). 
 
Her concern is that the ‗democratic‘ aspect of this relationship would be compromised 
because PMSCs would enable greater control by governments of public opinion 
regarding wars, or at least, diminish societies‘ exposure to war. By no longer using 
military forces who are both members and representatives of the community, the 
public would lose the ―direct access to the experiences and costs of going to war – 
experiences that not only affect the emotional support for a war but that are also 
relevant to rational debate about the justness of a war.‖ (Wolfendale 2008, p. 231)  
Wolfendale believes that the use of PMSCs can undermine the questioning process on 
the justification of a war that is so vital to the democratic control of force. 
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It should be noted that Wolfendale is not making the claim that the PMI does not have 
a role to play, but rather that it should not replace national military forces. Elke 
Krahmann goes further in arguing that private military contractors constitute a ‗new 
model soldier‘. (Krahmann 2008, p. 260) Krahmann even offers a reverse of the 
typical civil-military relations complaint against the PMI, but pointing out that, in 
addition to undermining the democratic control of force framework, Private Military 
Contractors can themselves be the victims. Krahmann describes how ―society and 
political leaders are less concerned about the loss of human lives among foreign and 
private military contractors than among national citizen-soldiers …‖ (Krahmann 
2008, p. 260) 
 
Krahmann goes on to advocate the necessity of improving political and legal 
oversight of the PMI as a fundamental aspect ―(e)nsuring political control and 
accountability over the publicly sanctioned use of armed force (as) a fundamental 
aspect of civil-military relations‖. (Krahmann 2008, p. 261) The question of the 
implementation of accountability and oversight therefore attains paramount 
importance in establishing legitimacy for the industry. 
 
The concerns raised in this section follow two major themes. First, there is a concern 
that PMI implementation violates the definitional security of the state by undermining 
the monopoly over the democratic control of force. In a similar sense, the second 
major theme revolves around the instrumental damage done to the civil-military 
relations framework by the implementation of the PMI, in terms of damage to the 
democratic process and in terms of the risks associated more generally with 
outsourcing and privatisation. The definitional threat to the state is dismissible by 
taking into account the changed variables in the global environment, which arguably 
necessitate an updated interpretation of the state‘s monopoly over the control of force. 
Overhauling the systems of accountability and oversight can mitigate the instrumental 
concern about the effect of the PMI on aspects of the democratic control of force. This 
requires an examination of attempts at regulation of the industry. 
 
Regulation, Oversight and Accountability 
Privatisation offers many benefits, particularly efficiency. The problem with 
privatisation is that it opens the door to the risks associated with its driving force, 
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competition. Competition in an uncertain market environment, especially in terms of 
uncertain legislation and governance is a worrying prospect. Arguably, the sphere of 
activity undertaken by PMSCs in the security industry makes this even more 
worrying.
52
 A major ‗practical‘ concern about mercenaries that has been commonly 
supported in the media using abundant empirical data, is the concern about the 
conduct of mercenaries (and PMSCs). Numerous examples exist of mercenary 
brutality, ranging from ancient times to the defining passage in the resurgence of 
mercenaries, the post-colonial African notoriety of the ‗Dogs of War‘ (as I have 
briefly explored in the previous chapter). Lately of course, the PMI has also received 
negative publicity over events globally and especially in Iraq.
53
 This is where the 
topic of regulation enters the ethical debate. In order to achieve any sort of legitimacy, 
at least in the sense of justifying the existence of mercenarism along consequentialist 
lines – some form of regulation is required. 
 
As Mervyn Frost comments: 
 
Privatisation is a public act, by a public authority, for the achievement of a 
public good. It involves the creation of an anarchical institution for the 
achievement of public goods. (Frost 2008, p. 54)  
 
Further to that, he adds:  
 
[t]he public in a democracy might seek to prevent ethically noxious outcomes 
coming about as a result of the process of privatisation, without at the same 
time destroying the anarchical structure within which privatised companies 
must, by definition, operate. The key to preventing such outcomes is 
regulation by public bodies. (Frost 2008, p. 54) 
 
A good introduction to regulating the PMI can be found in Jurgen Brauer‘s essay 
‗PMSCs: markets, ethics and economics‘ (Brauer 2008) which first defends the notion 
of supporting the PMI using economic theory (not purely by justifying it through 
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efficiency but utilising economic principals to guide an evaluation of the industry). He 
then emphasises the need for regulation by bypassing what he views as a distracting 
debate over public and private control of force:  
 
With Lynch and Walsh (2000), I am not so much arguing in favour of PMSCs 
as to challenge a certain type of anti-PMSC cogitation that divulges more fear 
than reasoning. For an economist the key is not how force is organised (private 
or public provision) but how force is organised (regulated). (Brauer 2008, p. 
110) 
 
Brauer goes on to say: 
 
The history of organising human warfare shows cyclical movement: 
sometimes more private, sometimes more public, always a mixture, rarely the 
exclusive provenance of one or the other. What changes are the conditions 
under which this or that organising principle is better suited to the purpose of 
war-making, or peacekeeping. (Brauer 2008, p. 111) 
 
The types of regulation called upon by Frost and Brauer hinges on external regulation 
through accountability and oversight. This, unfortunately, requires precisely the kind 
of legislative framework currently lacking in the international system. In the study of 
security governance, there is a distinction made between top-down and bottom-up 
privatisation – the former describing, for example, US incorporation of the PMI into 
its foreign policy while the latter describes non-state actors employing private 
contractors. However, in the face of some of the instrumental concerns posed by 
Wolfendale, Krahmann and Pattison regarding the protection of the framework of 
democratic control of force, it appears that supranational accountability and oversight 
is necessary.  
 
Because the UN (or any other multilateral organisation for that matter) is currently 
unable to effectively provide the required oversight and regulation of the PMI, other 
forms of regulation must be considered. Doug Brooks has been offering the IPOA 
(International Peace Operations Association) as a trade organisation and oversight 
enforcer for the industry for several years now. Some have expressed doubts about the 
 37 
effectiveness of an organisation like this – Peter Singer being one of them – and with 
good cause, given the events surrounding Blackwater Worldwide‘s ‗hiatus‘ from the 
organisation last year in the face of mounting criticism over controversies arising out 
of Iraq, notably the Nisoor incident. Whether this was a result of pressure from the 
IPOA or simply a move to allow Blackwater to create its own industry watchdog (the 
Blackwater Peace and Stability Operations Institute),
54
 is a matter of some debate. 
The IPOA is a voluntary, self-governing organisation – and as such, does not carry a 
particularly heavy regulatory stick. Nevertheless, any contemporary industry needs 
the kind of industry-focussed oversight perspective that an organisation like the IPOA 
offers. Doug Brooks and the IPOA feature prominently in the final two chapters of 
this dissertation. 
 
In addition to supranational external regulation and industry-run oversight, there is of 
course state-specific regulation to consider. The international legal approach to the 
PMI is insufficient at best. It hinges on an outdated understanding of mercenarism and 
the modern PMI, and is ill equipped to respond to the privatisation trend. At the same 
time, different states have responded in different way to the rise of the corporate 
warrior. On opposite ends of the polarised response, one finds South Africa and its 
controversial ‗Merc Bill‘
55
 and of the other, the United States and its approach to the 
matter. Marina Caparini explores precisely this approach in Regulating private 
military and security companies. (Caparini 2008, pp. 171-188) The reasons for this 
difference cover much of the same ground covered in the legal brief of the PMI issue 
in chapter one. Once again, history and political variables play a prominent role. The 
United States has a long history of contractor involvement, from the War of 
Independence, through the Civil War, and into Vietnam (Duiker 1995), the Gulf War 
and of course, the Global War on Terror. Moreover, the U.S. is at the very forefront of 
the globalised outsourcing trend, and, as such, it makes sense that they would most 
prominently be making use of, and indeed driving the development of, the PMI. In 
The Sorrows of Empire (2004), Chalmers Johnson berates this association with the 
PMI as facilitating an overall collapse into militarism and imperialism by the U.S. 
Conversely, Thomas Barnett, in The Pentagon‟s New Map (2004) celebrates the US‘s 
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role in ‗closing the gap‘ between ‗functioning core‘ and the ‗non-integrated gap.‘
56
 In 
an article for Scripps Howard News Service in September 2008, Barnett 





In comparison to the US‘s response to the industry, the South African government has 
recently enacted a tightening of the legislation prohibiting mercenary activity. 
Raenette Taljaard pays particular attention to this in Implementing South Africa‟s 
Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Act (Taljaard 2006) South Africa‘s legacy 
of Apartheid plays a major role in the government‘s response to the PMI. For 
instance, Executive Outcome‘s links to the Apartheid regime through its incorporation 
of CCB, ‗Koevoet‘ and 32 Battalion personnel placed it at odds with the post-1994 
government. Similarly, South Africa‘s prominent role in SADC and the AU has 
insured a close affiliation with the 1977 OAU Convention on the Elimination of 
Mercenarism in Africa (which closely mimics the UN Mercenary convention). 
Historical reasons aside, Taljaard points to several important issues arising out of the 
Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Act (which has since been surpassed by the 
Prohibition of Mercenary Activities and Prohibition and Regulation of Certain 
Activities in an Area of Armed Conflict Act). Notably, she raises a concern similar to 
Avant (Avant 2005, p. 184), that the South African response to the PMI merely serves 
to drive the industry underground, which not only damages any attempts at regulation 
and oversight, but also poses grave risks in the potential market environment of the 
African continent. Another concern that carries over to the latest set of legislation 
enacted in South Africa, is over the logical difficulty faced by any national legislative 
effort in the face of the transnational nature of the industry. This points once again to 
the need for the development of an international regulatory framework. 
 
Given the troubles faced by local and international regulatory legislation, and by 
industry-based regulation, there is another option available for the provision of at least 
some mitigation of the prudential concerns over the effects of privatisation over the 
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democratic control of force. Chistopher Kinsey introduces the idea of corporate social 
responsibility specifically in terms of ―voluntary acts that move beyond legal 
compliance and include investing more in human capital, the environment and 
stakeholders.‖ (Kinsey 2008, pp. 70-86)  
 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) may seem at first glance, an idealistic and 
potentially pointless effort given the context of its proposed employment, but 
Kinsey‘s suggestion does make a certain amount of sense. A major failing in the 
control of the PMI is the lack of legislative cohesion in both perception of and 
application to the industry. CSR offers the kind of internally regulated aspirational 
control that serves to support and at times prop up weak legislation in any other 
contemporary industry. So why not the privatised military and security industry? 
Taking that point further, a major strand of argument concerning the PMI is that it is a 
different entity to the traditional mercenary because of its corporate structure. If that is 
the case, and this argument is not merely re-branding designed to confuse the observer 
with a corporate shell placed over traditional mercenarism, then it is in the industry‘s 
best interest to continue actively pursuing greater CSR implementation. Kinsey sets 
out the extent of PMI CSR to include ―safeguarding the interests of stakeholders, 
ensuring transparency, promoting self-regulation and encouraging accountability and 
oversight.‖ (Kinsey 2008, p. 83) While Kinsey makes an argument that the industry 
itself sets the tone for this kind of social awareness, he also points out that the market 
itself dictates the emphasis on CSR. 
 
This notion of market regulation is what makes the notion of Corporate Social 
Responsibility so effective. CSR can be described as simply the existence of a 
‗conscience‘ by a company, an acknowledgement of an obligation to protect society 
from the negative impact of its business practice. Moreover, CSR serves to provide 
accountability and oversight within the company over issues such as the protection of 
the rights of stakeholders, including its employees. The 2004 death of four Blackwater 
contractors in Fallujah is largely attributed to the fact that their convoy was 
insufficiently armed and armoured. This concern has led to a legal case being 
mounted by the families of the deceased against Blackwater. The argument is that 
Blackwater was cutting costs – a familiar topic in business ethics, with its inherent 
tension between profit motive and social conscience. At this point CSR offers its self-
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regulatory function. The modern market has developed certain expectations of service 
which in turn dictate who succeeds and who does not. It is therefore in a PMSC‘s best 
interest to conform to the CSR expectations of the market in order to succeed 
financially. Kinsey argues that, in Iraq at least, this is already predominantly the case 
– that competition over enlightened customers has driven PMSCs to embrace socially 
responsible behaviour. (Kinsey 2008, p. 83) That is not to say that CSR is 
automatically applicable to the PMI. There are specific difficulties in implementing it, 
notably in terms of transparency, given the particular operational environment faced 
by the PMI. (Kinsey 2008, pp. 78-79) In addition, there are certain difficulties 
inherent to the protection of the rights of stakeholders. The Fallujah incident in 2004 
is an example of Blackwater allegedly failing to provide adequate firepower and 
armour for its employees. At the same time, standard close-protection detail protocols 
tend to call for aggressive driving, and handling of weapons to the point of seriously 
violating the rights of other stakeholders, namely the citizens of Iraq. Balancing and 
prioritising the rights and needs of stakeholders is one of the trickier aspects of CSR. 
However, it should be noted that this kind of reasoning is by no means exclusive to 
the PMI – the same kind of balancing problem is faced any time a U.S. Officer calls 
in an air strike in an urban area of Iraq. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter was designed to provide an evaluative overview of some of the ethical 
debate surrounding the topic of the PMI. The key issues are of the intrinsic morality 
of mercenarism; the consequential aspect of control of force and its effects on civil-
military relations; and the question of whether there is a morally significant difference 
between traditional mercenarism and the contemporary PMI. This chapter has shown 
that the question of intrinsic morality is dominated by outdated and falsely premised 
arguments relating to sufficient justification, and of a Machiavellian evaluation of the 
practise of mercenarism. It has shown how a stream of argument in the modern 
examination of the topic has shown mercenarism to be no more intrinsically immoral 
than national service soldiering. It has also shown the possibility of justified 
mercenarism, a concept that is valuable to the proposed privatisation of peacekeeping.  
 
The topic of control of force is also especially relevant to the privatised peacekeeping 
question. The monopoly over the control of force is a complicated and historically 
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important concept which is especially relevant to the debate on privatisation, given 
the modern globalised political environment. This chapter has shown how the 
privatisation of force raises concerns for the democratic control of that force, and how 
this area of concern serves a major hindrance to the legitimacy of the PMI. This in 
turn creates problems for the regulation of the industry, given that international law is 
unwilling and unable to clearly and unambiguously define mercenarism in the modern 
context, which creates subjectivity in its treatment at the national level. As a possible 
means of overcoming this deficit of accountability, I examined the concept of 
Corporate Social Responsibility, and its potential application in the PMI. This 
provides a potentially useful tool for the coming chapters. 
 
Chapters One and Two, taken together, provide an overview of the PMI issue. This 
overview enables further examination of the most popular subject stemming from the 
PMI debate – peacekeeping. It is now the task of this dissertation to examine the idea 
of privatisation of peacekeeping and peace support functions. Ultimately, this 
dissertation seeks to evaluate a particular type of argument raised in support of 
privatised peacekeeping, but it is first necessary to establish an understanding of the 
framework of the peacekeeping debate, and the conceptual roots of the argument in 





Peacekeeping and Africa 
 
Introduction 
Peacekeeping is a complicated concept which rests somewhat precariously on a set of 
ideals set forth by the United Nations in a very different global environment. (Tardy 
2007, p. 20) Not only has the nature of the global community changed, but so too 
have the types of conflicts that exist. (Shearer 1998, p. 75) This chapter explores the 
concept of peacekeeping, making mention of its historical roots to emphasise the 
changed realities that this concept now faces. In exploring the concept of 
humanitarian intervention, I pay close attention to the debate around the use of 
coercive force as part of a ‗responsibility to protect‘ because this area of discussion 
ultimately forms the sharp end of the debate around privatised peacekeeping. To 
support this, I also call upon material to sketch out the framework for privatisation of 
peace support, arguments that are already propounded by what is being referred to as 
the Peace and Stability Operations Industry. (Wright and Brooke 2006) 
 
A second part of this chapter is concerned with placing the question of privatised 
peacekeeping in the context of application in Africa. To this end, I briefly explore the 
issue of security governance in Africa and detail some of the UN‘s history of activity 
on the continent. This chapter is designed to provide the beginnings of the expediency 
argument that this dissertation ultimately sets out to critique. Evaluating the utility of 
privatisation of peace support operations requires an understanding of what can be 
gained, and of what is at stake. Chapter One has shown who is involved, and why a 
clear legal understanding of the Private Military (and Security) Industry is so 
challenging. Chapter Two has shown the ethical terrain involved, beginning with the 
deontological concerns about the intrinsic nature of mercenarism, and then the 
instrumental questions about the consequences of privatisation of force for notions of 
civil-military relations. It has also revealed an intense debate around differentiating 
between mercenaries and PMSCs. In this chapter, I continue to ask questions about 
privatisation of force, specifically in the context of privatised coercive force for 
humanitarian intervention purposes. This chapter provides the necessary information 
on the question of privatisation of peacekeeping, coupled with the groundwork 
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provided by Chapters One and Two, to enable informed debate on the topic in the 
final chapter of this dissertation. 
 
Introduction to Peacekeeping 
 
The term ‗peacekeeping‘ is not found in the United Nations Charter and defies 
simple definition. Dag Hammarskjöld, the second UN Secretary-General, 
referred to it as belonging to "Chapter Six and a Half" of the Charter, placing 
it between traditional methods of resolving disputes peacefully, such as 
negotiation and mediation under Chapter VI, and more forceful action as 




Peacekeeping is conceptually related to the idea of humanitarian intervention. This is 
a fundamental part of the United Nations Charter, which was originally designed as a 
means of preventing war. Its original designers picked up where the League of 
Nations left off, in attempting to establish a system of global governance that could 
prevent conflicts like the world had just experienced in the first and second world 
wars.  Chapter VI and VII of the Charter, which are mentioned in the above quote, 
provide the framework for peacekeeping by empowering the UN Security Council 
with the right to intervene.  
 
The notion of intervention is not without its complications – it has a long standing 
conflict with the Westphalian notion of sovereignty.
59
 Moreover, unilateral 
intervention has a long history of susceptibility to abuse by its very nature. (Shearer 
1998, p. 75) As a result, humanitarian intervention requires measures to assure its 
legitimacy.  A normative framework for peacekeeping exists in the Charter of the UN, 
which justifies humanitarian intervention as a means of protecting Human Rights and 
governing International Humanitarian Law. Furthermore, multilateral (or 
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supranational) oversight is provided by the system of Security Council Mandates. 
Unfortunately, this system also provided the fundamental weakness of the UN – its 
susceptibility to the political perspectives of its constituent members. The Cold War 
rendered the UN largely impotent. The modern globalisation and transnational trend 
has delivered added burdens. Victor-Yves Ghebali argues that globalisation affects 
intergovernmental organisations, which are based on multilateralism, by restraining 
nation-states‘ capacities to perform as fully sovereign entities. (Ghebali 2006, p. 227)  
Additionally, there is reluctance on the part of Western contributory members to 
become involved in expensive and politically risky interventions. This resulted in a 
shortage of skilled UN personnel and a trend towards limited enforcement of Chapter 
VII type interventions to enforce peace on reluctant belligerents. (Shearer 1998, p. 70) 
These factors have contributed to a series of highly publicised failures by the UN. The 
result has been a growing scepticism about the UN‘s overall capacity to deliver. 
(Ghebali 2006, p. 213) 
 
Robust Peacekeeping 
More recently, the UN has undergone several changes in its approach to ensuring 
international peace and security by shifting its focus from state-centred socio-
economic development to a more robust form of intervention. In conjunction with 
this, the UN has concluded that ―international peace and security (are) now 
endangered mainly by intra-state conflicts.‖ (Ghebali 2006, p. 213) Additionally, non-
state actors are considered a risk to security and good governance, and that weakened 
governance constitutes both a regional and global risk. (Ghebali 2006, p. 213) 
Importantly, there is recognition that modern conflicts tend to affect and indeed 
involve the specific targeting of civilian populations. These realisations have instilled 
a need for the expansion of collective security beyond the protection of the state, and 
the inclusion of human security concerns. The 2001 ICISS‘s report on The 
Responsibility to Protect (ICISS 2001) has created a framework for intervention while 
respecting the conception of sovereignty in the contemporary global arena that has 
been embraced by the UN. (Pattison 2008, pp. 2-3) 
 
This new approach to peacekeeping has included the UN‘s expansion of the concept 
of peacekeeping to include a spectrum of peace and security activities. The 2000 
Report of the Panel on the UN Peace Operations, more commonly known as the 
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Brahimi Report (Brahimi, 2000
60
) placed particular emphasis on peacebuilding. The 
2008 United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines (UN DPKO 
2008) details the evolution of UN Peacekeeping and provides in depth guidance for 
contemporary UN Peacekeeping operations. Chapter Eight of this document in 
particular documents Supporting and Sustaining UN Peacekeeping Operations with 
subsections about logistics and administration; human resource management; and 
security of personnel. Importantly, the UN has embraced the globalisation trend of 
outsourcing and privatisation in this regard. 
 
Privatised Peacebuilding 
There has been a ―growing trend over the past ten to 15 years of for-profit firms 
playing an increasingly important role as partners supporting peace, stability and 
reconstruction operations in conflict, post-conflict and post-disaster environments 
around the world.‖ (Wright and Brooke 2008, p. 105)  Wright and Brooke describe 
these for-profit companies as an indispensable and cost-effective contributor to the 
restoration of peace and stability, particularly in Africa. (Wright and Brooke 2008, p. 
105) It should be noted that Derek Wright and Jennifer Brooke are both employed by 
the IPOA, which obviously situates them firmly on the pro-PMI side of things. They 
describe the emergence of a Peace and Stability Operations Industry (PSOI).
61
 The 
PSOI offers services in three main areas: logistics and support, Security Sector 
Reform and Development (SSRD) and private security. (Wright and Brooke 2008, p. 
106) It‘s not a coincidence that this fits so well with Peter W. Singer‘s widely used 
PMI typology. The IPOA has supported the assertion that the structure of the PMI 
contributes largely to its distinction from traditional mercenarism. 
 
The first PSOI category for peace support entails logistics. Logistical support has 
been a historical bridge point between private firms and national militaries. One such 
example is the American Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP). (Wright 
and Brooke 2008, p. 106) Logistical support for multilateral peacekeeping is not new 
either, AFRICAP is a framework that has augmented AU peacekeeping missions for 
some time now – an example of which is the use of AYR Group to provide aviation 
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support to the AU in Darfur. (Wright and Brooke 2008, pp. 106-107) In addition to 
logistical support, there is the category of SSRD which includes companies that 
―provide expertise in training and development programmes aimed at assisting 
conflict-ridden countries rebuild their governmental, security, economic, civil society 
and legal sectors.‖ (Wright and Brooke 2008, p. 107) This rather broad area of 
development seems to compliment Singers‘ PMI category of training, at least in so far 
as security sector reform is concerned (one could easily picture a company like MPRI 
involved in retraining troops in a post-conflict zone with regards to Humanitarian Law 
and the like, as well as becoming involved in Disarmament, Demobilisation and 
Reintegration (DDR) programmes). In terms of the PSOI, firms like PADCO-
AECOM, which is a leader in SSRD in Uganda (Wright and Brooke 2008, p. 108) and 
are particularly involved in a national reconciliation programme. As with Singer‘s 
categories, these first two categories are not immediately controversial. However, this 
changes with the third category of the PSOI, private security. As the 2002 British 
House of Commons Green Paper (House of Commons, 2002) puts it: ―more 
problematic is the notion that private military forces might be used for politically 
sensitive and high-profile areas of UN operations, such as peacekeeping and peace 
enforcement.‖ (Ghebali 2006, p. 214) 
 
Security has been described as ―being 90 per cent of the problem but only 10 per cent 
of the solution for peace and stability‖ (Wright and Brooke 2008, p. 108) but is 
acknowledged as a critical, if not primary step in the peacekeeping process. Eeben 
Barlow argued at an Institute of Security Studies discussion on Privatisation of peace-
keeping in Africa back in 1997 that ―there can be no peace-keeping without peace.‖ 
(Barlow 2007, p 471) The United Nations acknowledges the importance of security, 
particularly in the post-Brahimi era of robust peacekeeping operations. However, 
privatised security is also commonly a grey area that tends to be abused by the PMI. 
In Shadow Company, a documentary film about the Private Military Industry, Doug 
Brooks comments that the PMI security function consists of guarding of ‗nouns‘ – 
people, places and things. This carries over to the security aspect of the PSOI, and 
carries with it the problem of the utilisation of force. In its most tame form, security 
provision might entail the use of defensive force. However, many of the current 
controversies coming out of Iraq regarding violent behaviour by PMSCs have 
ostensibly come about through either Personal Security Detachments or other ‗guard‘ 
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duties. Furthermore, the contemporary concept of ‗robust peacekeeping‘ calls for 
coercive force as a means of peacemaking and peace enforcement, blurring the 
distinction between defensive and coercive force. This would then fall into the 
security category. It is this aspect of privatised security that particularly interests this 
dissertation. 
 
The African Privatised Peacekeeping Market 
Taking a step back from questions about privatisation of force, it is important to 
explain in greater detail, the persistent focus on Africa in this dissertation. It should be 
noted that the PMI debate is currently geographically focussed on Iraq, although it 
was for a time interested in the Balkans region – particularly for example, Kellog 
Brown and Root‘s connection to LOGCAP contracts (Singer 2003, p. 138) and 
MPRI‘s training activities in Bosnia (Singer 2003, pp. 126-131).  Increasingly, the 
post-modern PMI has been focussing on Africa as its next potential market, and this 
then is where the debate must go. Geographical location does have a part to play in 
this debate, particularly in the context of Africa‘s general security and governance 
characteristics, and its history with both the UN and mercenarism.  
 
According to Christopher Clapham, Africa has been by far the most important 
regional setting for UN peacekeeping operations. (Clapham. 1999) He notes that UN 
Operations in the Congo (ONUC, 1960-64) dwarfed all other activities in this field 
during the Cold War. Since 1948 the UN has overseen sixty-five Peacekeeping 
operations, of which 16 are still being run across the globe. Of those sixty-five, 
twenty-five have been conducted in Africa. More tellingly, of the sixteen being run 
currently, seven are in Africa, and the remaining nine are scattered around Europe 
(Balkans region), the Middle East, Asia and the Americas.
62
 Africa is therefore clearly 
a major part of the international focus on peacekeeping, and with good reason. 
 
Post-colonial Africa is a regional stability nightmare.
63
 Western Europe had one 
thousand seven hundred years following the collapse of the Roman Empire to develop 
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into its current structure. In that time, it experienced wars of conquest, religious wars 
and wars of national determination. World War Two could be described as a terrible 
sort of maturation, as it paved the way for relative peace and stability, and even unity. 
For the most part, the continent of Africa has been free from colonial power for just 
under fifty years. In that time, the major challenge facing African states has been that 
of national self-determination.
64
 The primary concern here is the establishment of a 
post-colonial national identity. The problem quite simply is that the haphazard nature 
of the colonisation process has created a series of states based on geographical 
features or political agreements rather than the usual evolutionary route followed by a 
state in its development. The African continent was effectively carved up by 
European powers, and then in the late 1950s and 1960s these states suddenly found 
themselves in a position of establishing some measure of national identity and 
political stability.  
 
These states were hampered by several factors, including a lack of infrastructure, 
following the withdrawal of Western control. This withdrawal also created an 
inevitable power vacuum. Coupled with this vacuum was another relic of the colonial 
legacy – a confused political landscape in which different and historically separate 
groups of people were now lumped together in an unstable ‗nation‘. This has led to 
religious conflict in the Sudan and Somalia/Ethiopia/Eritrea regions where 
Christianity and Islam are in conflict with each other. Artificial nationhood has also 
led to ethnic conflicts, which have also had the tendency to spread beyond political 
borders, in line with the traditional regions of ethnic heritage. Continual upheaval in 
the Congo region for instance, is largely attributable to this kind of spillover effect 
and is a major challenge in an environment where containing conflict and improving 
regional stability is so very vital for the economic and political future of the continent. 
 
The UN‘s history in Africa is complicated however. The nature of the Security 
Council contributed to the weakness of the UN during the Cold War. In Africa this 
was felt in proxy conflicts such as Angola in the 1970s. In the Post-Cold War era 
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there are also inherent problems in the relationship between Security Council 
members and Africa that continue to affect peacekeeping operations today. Both the 
UK and France had substantial colonial interests in the continent, and consequently, 
few if any major UN operations have occurred in former UK or French colonies. 
(Clapham, 1999, p. 2) United States involvement in Africa has been limited, but in 
Somalia for instance, poor coordination between US forces and UN forces 
undermined the UN mission in that region. (Clapham 1999, p. 2) Additionally, while 
the Security Council members are responsible for approving mandates of 
peacekeeping operations, they are very rarely major contributors to the operations 
themselves. As David Shearer notes, there is a reluctance to become involved in direct 
interventions – mostly because of the associated political risks. (Shearer 1998, p. 75)  
 
US involvement in Somalia ended after the political backlash following the 
‗Blackhawk Down‘ incident, and characterised much of American foreign policy until 
the advent of the Global War on Terror (GWOT). Nevertheless, Doug Brooks and 
Matan Chorev argue that, despite the dramatic expansion in number and scope of UN 
peacekeeping operations since 1990, ―UN peacekeeping capacity has not matched the 
increasingly exacting demands of member nations, and in fact has actually 
diminished, as Western nations have grown increasingly reluctant to participate.‖ 
(Brooks and Chorev, 2008, pp. 117) Brooks and Chorev further argue that principal 
contributors to UN missions have been from developing countries, rather than 
‗NATO-class militaries‘. This ‗Westernless peacekeeping‘ has been a major cause of 
inefficiency in UN operations, and a big part contributor to the attractiveness of 
outsourcing. Clapham further notes that interaction between the UN and regional 
organisations and powers in Africa has been troublesome. (Clapham, 1999, pp. 2) 
 
The UN Charter allows for coordination with regional authorities to supplement or 
enable intervention (specifically Article 53). In Europe this would mean coordination 
with the European Union (EU) or NATO. In Africa, this traditionally has meant 
coordinating with the AU (formerly the OAU)
65
 and economic communities such as 
the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and Economic Community 
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Of West African States (ECOWAS). A contemporary example of this is the 
combination of UN and AU peacekeeping operations in Darfur.
66
 Unfortunately, this 
tends to result in poorly trained (Brooks and Chorev 2008, p. 177), ill disciplined 
(Hough 2007, p. 12), badly led and under equipped troops (Brooks and Chorev 2008, 
p. 120) getting involved in underfunded and politically pressured missions (Clapham 




In addition there are implementation problems in Africa that create further difficulties 
for peacekeeping efforts. At the Joint Operations Africa conference held in Cape 
Town in 2006 Helmoed Heitman delivered an address entitled A Regional Perspective 
on Joint Operations which explained that joint operations are a vital requirement in 
the African environment, mostly because of the sheer scale involved. He pointed out 
that Africa is ten times the size of Western Europe, but has significantly less 
infrastructure in place, especially with regards to roads, railways, airfields and ports. 
This lack of logistical infrastructure puts strain on any kind of peacekeeping operation 
– and especially on one being conducted primarily by ill-equipped and poorly trained 
personnel. While Heitman argued that this put the more developed powers in Africa in 
a position of responsibility to provide the defence capabilities that are lacking 
(specifically South Africa), it is not necessarily the case that this is enough.  
 
In 1998, a SANDF/BDF (South African National Defence Force/ Botswana Defence 
Force) joint force was charged by the SADC with re-establishing stability in Lesotho 
when the country collapsed into so-called anarchy following an allegedly corrupt 
parliamentary election in 1998. Operation Boleas is considered, at best, a stabilising 
operation (which, despite the support of the SADC, created much concern in the AU 
and UN). It is considered to be largely a failure in that it caused more damage that it 
was sent to prevent.
68
 It also showed that even the SANDF (which at the time was still 
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considered by many as the best equipped, best trained, most capable fighting force on 




There is another challenge facing combined peacekeeping efforts – the problem of 
joint operation coordination that arises out of very different military structures and 
capabilities being put under a single command. This is an historical problem 
associated with joint-force operations, and was a major concern for NATO for 
instance, during the Cold War. Standardised logistics are one element of the problem 
(relating to spare parts, fuel standards, transport standards and ammunition). In the 
less developed infrastructure of Africa, this logistical concern is heightened. For 
instance, the standard weapon of choice for many African states is the ubiquitous 
AK47/AKM, firing a 7.62x39mm round. Some states however, have numbers of 
newer AK74s which fires a smaller and more manageable 5.54x39mm round. Other 
states make use of a number of FN FAL rifles, which fire the 7.62x51mm NATO 
standard round. South Africa, on the other hand, uses the R4 and R5 range of weapons 
which fire the 5.56x45mm NATO round.
70
 This means that any given joint operation 
could conceivably require four different types of standard rifle ammunition and would 
accordingly require the logistical complexity to supply these different types of 
ammunition. This only increases the cost and difficulty of a joint operation. This 
complexity also extends to radio communication protocols and even language 
differences. (Hough 2007, p. 18) ECOWAS must contend with English and French 
speaking elements as well as Portuguese and Arabic. There are also fundamental 
differences in command structures and protocols as well as political perspectives, 
largely a result of the Cold War. These factors all combine to place a great deal of 
strain on peacekeeping initiatives in Africa. 
 
It is important in a chapter detailing the UN history in Africa to cover one case in 
particular, an especially infamous combination of UN operations: UNOMUR (UN 
Observer Mission to Uganda and Rwanda) and UNAMIR (UN Assistance Mission for 
Rwanda). These operations ran during the 1994 Rwandan Genocide and are 
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considered to be among the greatest UN failures in Africa.
71
 Following the Arusha 
Accords in 1993, Rwanda looked set to overcome the civil war that had been running 
in the region for years. Effectively, the conflict was between the Tutsi rebels of the 
Rwandan Patriotic Front and the Hutu dominated Government. UNAMIR was 
mandated with an observational role and a duty to protect the provisions of the Arusha 
Accord.
72
 Unfortunately violence broke out again (including the shooting down of a 
plane containing the Rwandan President (Barlow 2007, p. 440)) and a general state of 
chaos ensued.  
 
The UN peacekeepers on the ground were unsure of their legal rights and the rules of 
engagements in light of the complete breakdown of the Accord, which they were 
mandated to observe. At one point, a group of Belgian peacekeepers under attack 
were ordered by their commanding officer to surrender because they were unsure of 
their right to fight back. They were eventually executed. (Barlow 2007, p. 440) The 
killing continued, building up into what is now known as the Rwandan genocide, and 
which achieved holocaust proportions in one hundred days of terror. As a result of the 
deaths of those ten UN troops, Belgium withdrew their contribution to the 
peacekeeping force (which was a sizeable percentage), leaving a vastly outnumbered 
force which could do little but watch the slaughter.
73
 Lt. General Roméo Dallaire, 
commander of the UN Mission, pleaded with the UN Security Council and Kofi 
Annan (who was at the time in charge of the UN Department of Peacekeeping 
Operations) for a new mandate and, more importantly, reinforcements. What is 
considered by many to be a display of bureaucratic foot dragging meant that any real 





The Rwandan Genocide is cited as a prime motivating example for the establishment 
of a rapid reaction force, and was also a source of major reforms in the UN‘s 
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approach to peacekeeping in general, culminating in the Brahimi report. It also 
provides motivation for an African Standby Force which functions through the AU
75
 
in a similar manner to the NATO standby force. The genocide was also commonly 
mentioned by elements of the PMI as an area where PMI involvement could have 
made the difference. (Lilly 2000, p. 57) Eeben Barlow describes how EO was 
contacted by the UN and in fact went as far as to draw up plans for an EO-run 
intervention. (Barlow 2007, p. 441) 
 
Indeed, Eeben Barlow, and Tim Spicer of Aegis (formerly of Sandline International) 
have been making claims about their ability to provide humanitarian intervention for 
over a decade. In 2002, the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists 
published the article Marketing the New „Dogs of War‟ (ICIJ 2002) which focussed 
specifically on the activities of Tim Spicer. The ICIJ article quotes Spicer as saying 
that the world was waiting for ―the speed and flexibility with which they [PMSCs] 
can deploy, rather than wait for the U.N. to form a force.‖ (ICIJ 2002, p. 2) Spicer 
went on to suggest that PMSCs could be employed with the Northern Alliance in 
Afghanistan, and in Iraq to assist those resisting Saddam Hussein. He went on to 
propose that PMSCs be employed in the international community‘s interest, in 
missions such as ending the long-running conflicts in the Sudan, and even to topple 
Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe. (ICIJ 2002, p. 2) 
 
The idea of a privatised rapid deployment force has also caught the eye of Erik Prince, 
the founder of Blackwater Worldwide. Blackwater unveiled a subsidiary company 
called ‗Greystone‘ in 2005. (Scahill 2007, pp. 368-369) It is described as ―an 
international security services company that offers your country or organisation a 
complete solution to your most pressing security needs. We have the personnel, 
logistics support, equipment, and expertise to solve your most critical security 
problems.‖ (Scahill 2007, p. 367) Blackwater‘s plans to enter the humanitarian 
intervention market were further revealed by statements by Blackwater Vice 
Chairman Cofer Black at an international Special Forces conference in Jordan in 
2006. Here he announced that his company could deploy a small rapid-response force 
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to conflicts like the one in Sudan. He concluded his statement with: ―We're low cost 





This chapter has explored the notion of peacekeeping as a means of humanitarian 
intervention, and has outlined the UN‘s changing perspective on peacekeeping to 
incorporate notions of peacebuilding and ‗robust peacekeeping‘ in order to play a 
more effective role in the post-Cold War globalised environment. It is evident the UN 
is faced with many challenges, particularly with regard to the effective 
implementation of coercive force as a means of intervention. Various failures in this 
regard, most hauntingly in Rwanda in 1994, have created a call for alternatives. While 
contemporary peacekeeping comprises largely of peacebuilding components like 
DDR, SSR and Logistical Support, the security aspect is still considered vital and 
perhaps the most troubling. The nature of peacekeeping operations in Africa is a 
source of many of the difficulties in this regard. The UN‘s political and historical 
relationship with the continent, the political and strategic nature of the continent itself, 
and the problem of poor contributions by Western powers and weak contributions by 
developing and associated states contribute to an ineffective track record of 
peacekeeping operations in Africa. Privatisation and outsourcing is an overwhelming 
characteristic of contemporary globalisation, and has even been implemented as part 
of UN peacekeeping operations as part of what is sometimes referred to as the Peace 
and Stability Operations Industry (PSOI or the PSI). However, this has not extended 
as far as peace enforcement, although the possibility has been raised, and there are 
many who support the idea. This then is the task left for this dissertation: to examine 
the argument raised for privatised intervention in the form of a PMSC based rapid 
deployment intervention force. 
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The previous chapter has provided some idea of the challenges facing peacekeeping 
initiatives, particularly in Africa. It has shown that a major weakness in peacekeeping 
relates to insufficient manpower, specifically with respect to the capabilities required 
for multidimensional peacekeeping. This weakness stems from reluctance on the part 
of Western NATO-level powers to commit troops or resources to peacekeeping 
efforts. Consequently, developing nation troops tend to fill the ranks of peacekeeping 
missions either as part of the United Nations, or seconded through the African Union 
or other multilateral bodies such as SADC or ECOWAS. Missions tend to be further 
hampered by politically compromised, and financially and bureaucratically hamstrung 
mandates. As Ghebali puts it:  
 
Notoriously, UN peacekeeping operations are, more often than not, conducted 
by ill-trained, poorly-armed and badly-coordinated volunteers representing 
different cultures, operating with heterogeneous equipment and minimal 
funding and, to make things worse, lacking strong motivation. (Ghebali 2006, 
p. 224) 
 
This has resulted in several high profile failures and an unimpressive record, which 
has in turn created a generally pessimistic view of UN peacekeeping. Measures are 
being taken toward improvement of peacekeeping, including reforms in the UN 
approach toward peacekeeping and peace support. This has also increased the 
outsourcing of peace support functions such as logistical support and development 
roles. These two categories form part of what is sometimes referred to as the Peace 
and Stability Operations Industry (PSOI) (Wright and Brooke, 2006) or alternatively, 
the Peace and Stability Industry (Brook and Chorev, 2008).
77
 As with the general 
outsourcing trend, the privatisation of peacekeeping functions offers the possibility of 
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increased efficiency and cost effectiveness, something that certainly appeals to 
organisations like the UN (and even more so, the AU).  
 
This dissertation is however, focused on the more controversial security aspect of the 
PSOI – particularly where the security offered tends towards coercive force. So called 
‗robust peacekeeping‘ entails a blurring of the lines between peace enforcement and 
peacekeeping, and is considered one of the major facets of any rapid deployment 
intervention force. Many argue that the private sector is ideal for assisting here, and 
moreover, that concerns about private sector involvement in this regard, is 
outweighed by its potential effectiveness. The culmination of the groundwork 
provided in the previous three chapters enables me to examine that claim here. 
 
Privatisation’s Promise 
Peacekeeping has undergone conceptual changes to better cope with the challenges of 
an evolving global landscape. Despite these changes, UN peacekeeping has a poor 
success record. Reasons for this poor record were discussed in the previous chapter – 
most notably, a lack of contribution by Western members of the UN. ―Into the gap 
have stepped today‘s private military companies.‖ (Shearer 1998, p. 71) This 
pragmatic ‗gap filling‘ is complimented by arguments at the conceptual level that 
privatisation also offers the benefits that come from competition. As Herbert Wulf 
explains in the context of outsourcing military functions:  
 
According to the dominant economic theory, the market is better qualified 
to handle these functions and carry them out more efficiently than the 
armed forces themselves. (Wulf, 2008, p. 194) 
 
 The International Peace Operations Association (IPOA) is a highly visible promoter 
of the Private Military Industry. They are, for instance, contributors to efforts in 
differentiating the Private Military Companies (PMCs) or Private Security Companies 
(PSCs) from traditional mercenarism. This is not only to counteract negative 
perceptions of the industry within the U.S. context, but also in terms of the wider 
debate on the treatment of PMSCs by International Law. The IPOA, as described by 
its name, is especially interested in promoting the potential for PMI expansion into a 
‗peacekeeping market‘. The Peace and Stability Industry is an example of this.  Doug 
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Brooks is president of this ―non-governmental, non-profit, non-partisan association of 
service companies dedicated to improving international peacekeeping effort through 
greater privatisation.‖ (Alexandra et al 2008, p. x) He describes the PMI as an 
effective means of ‗closing the gap‘ between contemporary demand for peacekeeping 
activities, and what the international community is actually capable (or willing) of 
supplying.   
 
Brooks and Chorev make special mention of the advantages of private sector 
involvement in peacekeeping. They describe the dramatic difference between 
deployment times for the regular military, UN forces and the private sector – four 
months, six to eight months and two to three weeks respectively. (Brooks and Chorev, 
2008, pp. 120) Another advantage raised by Brooks and Chorev relates to the 
comparatively small size of private operations which they interpret as minimizing the 
―footprint and negative externalities of large-scale intrusive interventions.‖ (Brooks 
and Chorev, 2008, p. 121) Further to this, they describe how the private sector 
practise of utilising locals to a greater degree than regular militaries or the UN has the 
advantage of ―reinforcing indigenous authority as well as boosting the local economy 
and laying the foundation for the long-term sustainability of reconstruction efforts.‖ 
(Brooks and Chorev, 2008, p. 121) 
 
As part of the continuing debate on the use of private actors in force projection roles, 
Brooks and Chorev take this opportunity to dispel some of what they consider to be 
‗myths‘ relating to the abilities of contractors. They note that continued operations in 
Iraq have revealed the high level of risk tolerance, and the capacity to successfully 
accomplish their functions in a highly volatile environment (Brooks and Chorev, 
2008, p. 123). They also cite Iraq as evidence of the superiority of privatisation for 
tasks such as logistics: ―compared to past conflicts, logistics in Iraq is ‗too easy‘, 
leaving some officers to voice concerns that troops are in fact too well supplied and 
too comfortable.‖ (Brooks and Chorev, 2008, p. 123) 
 
The IPOA support for privatisation is therefore two-fold. First, it argues that 
privatisation is necessitated as a means of closing the gap between the requirements of 
contemporary peacekeeping, and the actual capacity to fulfil those requirements. 
Second, in support of this, it argues that the private sector is equipped to surpass the 
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capabilities of current peacekeeping initiatives, and, at least in the area of logistics, 
surpass even Western military capabilities. 
 
Arguments based on capabilities tend to rely on empirical data from a specific set of 
case studies. Iraq has provided much supporting evidence for all manner of arguments 
relating to privatisation. Sierra Leone is a favoured case cited in support of the 
capabilities of privatised intervention in the sense of more overt coercive force that is 




Hough examines four military interventions into Sierra Leone between 1995 and 
2000. These four interventions include the Executive Outcomes intervention between 
1995 and 1996, the ECOMOG
79
 intervention between 1997 and 2000, UNAMSIL 
(United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone)
80
 between 1999 and 2005, and United 
Kingdom involvement in 2000. Hough finds that the PMSC intervention by EO and 
the national force intervention by the UK were more effective than the regional and 
international forces‘ efforts. In assessing the independent variables of these missions, 
Hough spends some time describing the clarity of the EO and UK mandates, 
compared to those under which UNAMSIL and ECOMOG operated. Both EO and the 
UK intervention were fulfilling clearly defined peace enforcement roles, while 
ECOMOG and UNAMSIL seem to have been caught up in the ambiguity of ‗robust 
peacekeeping.‘ ECOMOG‘s mandate was unilaterally changed to peace enforcement 
in reaction to changes that occurred in Sierra Leone after EO had left, which created 
considerable tension and confusion for the peacekeepers and the people of Sierra 
Leone. This was only resolved after Sandline International (a PMC with an 
intertwined history with Executive Outcomes (Barlow 2007, pp. 389, 453-458, 465)) 
was brought in to play a force multiplier role (Hough 2007, pp. 14-15) in order to 
restore some order. In the case of UNAMSIL the unclear mandate resulted in an 
intervention force that was not logistically configured to provide any Chapter VII 
peace enforcement. (Hough 2007, p. 15)  
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More specifically to the question of privatisation advantages, Hough notes that both 
EO and the UK contingent consisted of small elite forces, compared to the large, 
diverse, and poorly trained troops of the multilateral efforts. In addition, the smaller 
groups enjoyed superior logistical support and technology Regardless, these small 
intervention forces were far better equipped than the larger multilateral forces, and 
also equipped appropriately for the type of mission at hand. Hough goes on to 
describe how these smaller groups were able to acquire better intelligence than their 
larger counterparts, and interact more effectively with the local populace. (Hough 
2007, pp. 17-18) As a final point, Hough argues that the incentive structures involved 
were an important factor. An EO contractor is aware that failure risks his livelihood 
and jeopardises his source of income. (Hough 2007, p. 19) By contrast, soldiers 
involved in multilateral operations are driven primarily by the respective 
‗professionalism‘ of their own national military. Therefore, a highly professional 
military organisation, as with the UK Special Forces, would psychologically impel a 
soldier to do his best as part of a collective ethic in which discipline and chain of 
command override the natural tendencies of an individual rational actor. In a military 
organisation characterised by a lack of professionalism, the soldier remains an 
individual profit-maximizer with no incentive to put himself at risk on behalf of 
collective security. (Hough 2007, p. 19) 
 
The points raised by Hough therefore seem to support the claims by Brooks and 
Chorev (and the IPOA), and claims by past and present members of the PMI, about 
the capabilities of the industry to provide coercive peacekeeping force. In terms of the 
Peace and Stability Industry, privatisation has already been accepted for logistical and 
development functions. The question of security, specifically in terms of private use 
of coercive force is however, still a matter of debate. There is a large body of 
argument presented by industry representatives that propose the benefits of 
privatisation. These arguments are supported by cased-based evidence, chiefly 
Executive Outcomes‘ intervention in Sierra Leone. The rise of the notion of a rapid 
deployment force, coupled with an increasing trend toward privatisation has led to a 
debate that is dominated by a specific type of argument. I attempt to capture this 
argument in a formal structure, below.  
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The Expediency Argument 
In general, ‗expediency arguments‘ appeal to notions of speed and efficiency. The 
common usage refers to political expediency, which implies a motivation to bypass 
bureaucratic impediments. More generally, expediency arguments can be described as 
arguments that exhibit a particular fitness, both content and in the effectiveness of the 
argument itself. There is however, a pessimism attached to this notion. Expediency, 
according to the Oxford Dictionary, denotes an argument for something that is 
necessary but not always right or fair. Expediency arguments are linked (for instance) 
to the Suffragette movement. One pro-suffrage argument made was that granting 
women the vote would serve as a means of offsetting the foreign vote.
81
 This 
exhibition of political expediency appealed to the thinking at the time, and as a result, 
it is argued that provinces in the Canadian West were among the first to grant women 




I apply the label of ‗expediency argument‘ to the bulk of the arguments in favour of 
privatisation of peacekeeping. I am aware of the negative connotations of this label, 
and intend them to apply here too. It is not, however, the idea of privatised 
peacekeeping itself that I am opposed to. Rather, in the tradition of Lynch and 
Walsh‘s ‗anti-anti-mercenarism‘, I am sceptical of the type of argument commonly 
used to support privatised peacekeeping. It is this type of argument that I label an 
‗expediency argument‘. 
 
The prototypical expediency argument justifies the privatisation of peacekeeping 
operations as a means of overcoming the weaknesses of the current system. This is 
usually underlined with empirical evidence of failures of the UN system, most notably 
in Rwanda. The expediency argument advocates the use of private actors as a cost 
effective and efficient means of peacekeeping and peace enforcement that will benefit 
those who would not otherwise be reachable by such initiatives. To underline this 











point, Executive Outcomes‘ actions in Sierra Leone are usually called upon. The 
IPOA approach to lobbying in favour of the PMI follows this general pattern. 
 
PMI efficiency and cost provides the impetus for the argument for privatised 
peacekeeping, but there is benefit in changing the international community‘s 
perception of the PMI. Officially sanctioned privatised peacekeeping could also 
provide legitimacy for the PMI. This aspect might serve as a means of encouraging 
membership of the IPOA by Private Military and Security Firms, but is rarely voiced 
in the mainstream argument for privatised peacekeeping. The allure of the expediency 
argument lies in a combination of its packaging as a concise solution to a problem, 
and the utilitarian type of justification that is evoked in its humanitarian marketing. 
This is not an immoral or unjustified type of argument per se, but does have limits 
that are commonly overstepped. 
 
The Consequentialist Trump 
James Pattison (Pattison 2008) offers a succinct take on the privatised peacekeeping 
debate, and promotes an argument that hinges on a ‗consequentialist trump‘. His 
argument begins with an introduction to the notion of utilising private contractors for 
humanitarian intervention. Here he lists four primary objections to the idea: That the 
proposal is unfeasible; that the humanitarian intervention is inappropriately 
motivated; that privatisation reduces the degree of democratic control over the 
intervention; and that there is insufficient legal accountability over the PMI. 
 
Although Pattison dismisses the first objection as largely mistaken (Pattison 2008, pp. 
11-13), he acknowledges that the three remaining normative claims (which I have 
covered in Chapters One and Two) are convincing. He further acknowledges the 
temptation to respond to these concerns by redirecting them at the UN, but warns 
against such a move: ―If other agents have similar problems, it does not follow that 
using PMSCs becomes morally justifiable. Rather, the proper conclusion should be 
that we regard both PMSCs and other agents‘ intervention as morally unjustifiable.‖ 
(Pattison 2007, p. 25)  
 
‗Inappropriate motive‘ can be easily dealt with in the same way that Lynch and Walsh 
and Baker dealt with this topic, as we saw in Chapter Two.  Likewise, questions of 
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democratic control and legal accountability can be turned back on, for instance, 
ECOMOG forces. (Hough 2007, pp. 12-13) Pattison argues however that this 
approach serves merely to undermine the notion of intervention itself, rather than 
enhancing the argument for privatised intervention.  
 
Pattison instead employs a consequentialist argument that evaluates the overall moral 
justifiability of the privatisation proposal. (Pattison 2008, p. 25) This ‗consequentialist 
trump‘ does not challenge the validity of the three remaining objections raised against 
the proposal, but instead challenges the weight that they carry.  He advocates an ‗ends 
justifying the means‘ type of evaluation, predictably supported by the case of 
Executives Outcomes in Sierra Leone. (Pattison 2008, p. 26) He does stipulate that 
two conditions must be met in order for the PMSCs effectiveness to be sufficient 
justification. First, the humanitarian crisis must be ‗extremely serious‘. Secondly there 
must be a high probability of the PMSC being successful in its role. With these two 
conditions fulfilled, Pattison concludes that ―in the messy circumstances of 
humanitarian intervention, holding out for the ideal – for an intervener that is fully 
legitimate – is likely to involve a long wait,‖ and that ―the issue of using these 
companies to undertake humanitarian intervention will arise more and more as their 
use generally increases. And when the question does arise, we should not necessarily 
say no.‖ (Pattison 2008, p. 32) 
 
Consequences of Consequentialism 
There are several contentious points in Pattison‘s argument. His dismissal of the first 
objection relating to the feasibility of privatised peacekeeping seems to rely on 
reiterating the typical list of ‗promises of privatisation‘ as well as giving examples of 
the privatisation of peacekeeping logistics and development not to mention the 
obligatory example of Sierra Leone. He also feels that the existence of a trade 
organisation lends feasibility to the notion of privatised peacekeeping. More 
worryingly, he asserts that humanitarian intervention and peacekeeping missions can 
be distinguished from outright war-fighting because they tend not to involve heavy 
fighting. This is something Executive Outcomes veterans might disagree with, and is 
certainly the kind of assumption that has plagued peacekeeping missions like 
UNAMSIL, caught between peacebuilding and peace enforcement. In addition, any 
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arguments one might raise are presumably subject to the same ‗consequentialist 
trump‘ treatment. 
 
The primary problem with Pattison‘s argument is with the consequentialist trump 
itself. This kind of thinking can be described as reckless given the gravity of its 
employment. One question that arises out of any assertion that ‗the ends justify the 
means‘ is of how far this kind of justification will carry. In other words, where does it 
stop? Recall Tim Spicer‘s offer to provide intervention even to the point of toppling 
leaders. The justification of ‗regime change‘ for humanitarian has been experimented 
with recently by the United States, but is surely not an envisaged function of the UN. 
To push the point a little further, Pattison argues that ―PMSCs could therefore be a 
useful compromise, allowing states that wish to tackle a humanitarian crisis a 
politically and militarily viable way of doing so.‖ (Pattison 2007, p. 13) Taken with 
the end-means argument in mind, this kind of undermining of civil-military relations 
(as Jessica Wolfendale warns) at least opens the door for more serious breaches such 
as coups and assassinations.  
 
According to the consequentialist trump, if the UN is unable to perform humanitarian 
interventions then a less ideal, less legitimate unilateral intervention might be 
justifiable, assuming the situation is very serious and there is a good chance that the 
unilateral intervention could succeed. These provisions are unfortunately subjective in 
their presentation, which would tend to exacerbate the systemic faults in the UN 
system. They require impossible degrees of foresight to judge the potential 
effectiveness of PMSC employment (in order to justify the other concerns raised 
against privatisation). This would likely paralyse the entire system.  There is instead 
the concern that the PMI can enable unilateral interventions. The problem is that this 
undermines multilateral peacekeeping, and is susceptible to many of the civil-military 
relations concerns relating to the PMI. Notably, unilateral action is inherently biased, 
and the control of force in this case requires a system of accountability. Privatisation 
undermines the instrumental value of the civil-military relationship and greatens the 
risk of abuse associated with unilateral interventions. This concern is voiced by US 
Congressional Representative Jan Schakowky, who, describes Blackwater 
Worldwide‘s interest in involvement in Darfur as ominous:  
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[S]uddenly you‘ve got a for-profit corporation going around the world that is 
more powerful than states; can effect regime change, possibly, where they 
may want to go; that seems to have all the support that it needs from this 
Administration. (Scahill 2007, p. 356) 
 
Schakowsky‘s concern goes on to argue that the Administration is able to bypass 
Congress in this manner. This type of unilateral employment could even be extended 
to individuals, ―philanthropists like Bill Gates or George Soros,‖ as Scahill points out. 
(Scahill 2007, p. 354) There are obvious concerns with the idea of, for example, rich 
Hollywood ‗philanthropists‘ funding PMSC-run interventions. 
 
The problems with the consequentialist trump highlight a particular theme common to 
expediency arguments for privatisation of peacekeeping. There is a danger or falling 
into a pattern of consequentialist thinking that borders on emotional blackmail. This 
kind of counter may in fact be precisely the kind of ‗ruthless humanitarianism‘ that 
Brooks and Chorev are accusing the UN in particular of. In a sense, this is indeed 
precisely what it at stake here – the protection of a greater concern than the plight of 
those who could, maybe, be helped by a sudden embracing of the privatised 
peacekeeping described by the IPOA or Pattison. This then is the dilemma that faces 
the UN in attempting to pursue its global role. This now becomes a complicated 
question in terms of what rights are in fact granted to the UN with regards to playing 
the role of a global government, and flirts with Utopian notions (Wulf 2008 p. 201) 
that are beyond the scope of this dissertation. It is important to raise the final point 
that the thinking behind expediency arguments in favour of privatised peacekeeping 
could just as easily be labelled ‗ruthless humanitarianism‘. If one chooses to evaluate 
by that kind of utilitarian thinking, then there must be a recognition of the allure of 
immediacy, which might make the consequentialist trump appear more reasonable 
than it really is. In this case, it might be that by heeding the consequentialist trump, a 
far greater crisis is created that causes more harms or suffering than would have 
otherwise occurred.  
 
Non-profit Peacekeeping 
There is an alternative to the consequentialist trump – one that doesn‘t override 
concerns about the industry, but, rather, attempts to diffuse them. I examine this 
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alternative in order to show how some responses to the debate on privatised 
peacekeeping can be both naively based and misdirected. Tobias Masterton is the 
Director and Co-Founder of Global Peace and Security Partnership (GPSP), an 
organisation that offers ―a rapid response, not-for-profit peacekeeping and defence 
force‖ designed specifically for the ―prevention or containments of Low Intensity 
Conflicts.‖ (Masterton 2004) The GPSP offers a way for the private industry to 
facilitate peace support operations and act as a rapid deployable delaying force while 
the international community goes through the comparatively slow process of 
multilateral coordination for intervention. Christopher Spearin notes that this 
approach faces considerable challenges, despite its potential benefits. (Spearin 2005, 
p. 241)  
 
The defining characteristic of the GPSP is that it is a non-profit organisation. 
Masterton contends that it still exhibits the advantages of rapid deployment, cost-
effectiveness and technical efficiency that are usually attributed to private sector 
interventions but because it is a non-profit organisation, Masterton believes that it 
attains legitimacy or, at least, distance from the traditional ‗mercenary‘ label. (Spearin 
2005, pp. 242-243) There are problems with this however. While Masterton asserts 
that regulation and accountability are assured by the GPSP, there is no particular 
reason to believe that a non-profit organisation has any particular qualities beyond a 
for-profit organisation in this regard. Weak or strong international legislation applies 
equally to for-profit and non-profit organisations. What the non-profit nature of the 
GPSP does however do is rob this proposal of the market forces that provide 
improved efficiency to the private sector in the first place. This also results in the loss 
of the framework for a system of self-imposed Corporate Social Responsibility.  
 
As pointed out in Chapter Two, a large part of the PMI debate revolves around 
showing that CSR is a vital part of the corporate take on traditional mercenarism, and 
is an essential aspect of any business initiative in the contemporary globalised 
economy.
83
 It provides vital support for both international and domestic legislation. 
Without profit-motive to drive the need for greater market efficiency, there is little 
motivation to enforce or aspire to Corporate Socially Responsible behaviour. In 
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addition, Spearin raises concerns about the attractiveness of a non-profit in terms of 
manpower (Spearin 2005, pp. 247-248). Masterton describes the GPSP as offering 
pay rates ―commensurate with international civil service scales in similar fashion to 
the UN.‖ (Masterton 2004, p. 3)  Given that measures have had to be put in place to 
hinder the ‗brawn drain‘ that has resulted from national force personnel migration to 
the better paying private contractor world (Spearin 2005, p. 248), it is unlikely that a 
non-profit organisation will be able to attract the high quality personnel that are 
integral to its proposed function, with payment incentives that are merely equivalent 
to the international community standard.  
 
The Advanced Expediency Argument 
Masterton‘s non-profit organisation and Pattison‘s ‗consequentialist trump‘ are just 
two approaches to promoting privatisation of peacekeeping functions. I included the 
GPSP in this evaluation, to show how attempts at bypassing anti-privatisation 
concerns can fail, and to show how interrelated these concerns are. This is just a 
branch of the expediency argument type. The prototypical argument tends more 
towards Pattison‘s attempt, which I have criticised for promoting a reckless type of 
consequentialism. These two refutations do not constitute a failure of the expediency 
argument type however. The primary reasoning behind expediency arguments for 
privatisation of peacekeeping is still credible. It is possible to overcome those 
problems facing privatised force without resorting to questioning the weight that they 
carry, but rather by addressing the concerns themselves – particularly by way of an 
informed evaluation of the overall privatisation debate. 
 
The three major concerns that Pattison lists effectively capture the major anti-
privatisation arguments and will be employed again here: a deontological argument 
against the intrinsic morality of the industry; arguments around the control of force, 
and its effects on civil-military relations at the conceptual and instrumental levels, and 
the question of legal regulation and accountability. I will consider each of these in 
turn. 
 
The first objection relates to the intrinsic morality of the industry. This concern forms 
the basis for much of the UN (and certain domestic) approaches to the PMI. As shown 
in Chapter Two however, the common Machiavellian argument is not necessarily 
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effective, nor is the argument around sufficient justification. As Lynch and Walsh, 
Coady and Baker (among others) have made great progress in showing, there is 
nothing in the intrinsic nature of mercenaries, either regarding their moral character or 
in the justification behind mercenarism itself, which condemns the PMI.  This 
conclusion can be coupled with input by the likes of Wulf and Milliard in favour of a 
meaningful difference between the PMI and traditional mercenarism in order to form 
a compelling two-pronged defence of the industry against the typical moral arguments 
brought against it. It is important to take into account the historical background 
provided in Chapter One. Mercenarism had a long and ancient history that did not 
carry any of the stigma attached to the notion today. A selective historical profile of 
the industry is dominated by the Machiavellian perception, and the memory of ‗Les 
Affreux‘.
84
 This perception not only dominates the public image of mercenarism, but 
has also characterised the legislative treatment of the topic. This entrenched 
conceptualisation has carried over to the PMI. While many of the pejorative concerns 
about mercenarism are indeed well-deserved, this negativism should not dictate the 
definition of mercenarism. All that this achieves is to foster an outdated and 
ambiguous legal definition, which in turn, hinders regulatory measures. 
 
The second major question focuses on the effects of privatisation on notions of 
control of force. It can be captured in the question posed by Frost: ―Are there some 
functions which ought not be privatised?‖ (Frost 2008, p. 48) Conceptual concerns 
relating to the damaging effects of privatisation on a Weberian system (either state-
based or supranational) appear to be unfounded. Herbert Wulf (2006) describes the 
incompatibility of the traditional account of the monopoly of force, with the modern 
‗lean state‘ trend, which entails emptying the state of many of its functions. 
Additionally, the Westphalian ideal of sharply drawn, distinctly demarcated states 
contrasts to the reality of globalisation. (Wulf 2006, p. 97) At the supranational level 
the same is true, Ghebali argues that Article 42 of the UN Charter ―attributes to the 
Security Council the monopoly of the legitimate use of force for the maintenance of 
international peace and security.‖ (Ghebali 2006, p. 226) He then follows this with the 
acknowledgement that Article 51 expressly allows for the exercise of the right to self-
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defence by an individual state or collective in the event of an armed attack.
85
 Chapter 
VIII of the Charter goes on to describe regional arrangements such as Article 53,
86
 
which allows for the use of AU/ECOMOG type regional forces. Taken together, the 
UN Charter seems more to have been interpreted as promoting a Weberian paradigm. 
Indeed, Herbert Wulf argues that, ―At the global level the monopoly of force is 
completely lacking. A generally accepted, globally practiced monopoly of force does 
not exist and the weakness and impotence of the UN Security Council in the case of 
the 2003 Iraq invasion is demoralising evidence of this fact.‖ (Wulf 2006, p. 93)
87
 
Given that much of its content was laid down long before the notion of privatised 
peacekeeping; or the modern requirements for robust peacekeeping in the face of 
contemporary intra-state conflict; or globalisations collectivised security – it appears 
that concerns about the control of force are, at the conceptual level, unfounded. 
 
The question of the effects of privatised force on the instrumental value of democratic 
control carries over from the civil-military relations concerns raised by Jessica 
Wolfendale. This concern is often raised in relation to the unilateral employment of 
privatised force for intervention purposes. For example, P.W. Singer argues that the 
Abrams Doctrine,
88
 which has characterised U.S. civil-military relations since 
Vietnam, has effectively been outsourced. (Singer 2007, p. 111) Consider that the 
Abrams Doctrine was intended precisely to avoid involvement (and entrapment) in 
unpopular wars following Vietnam. Consider also that the privatisation trend has 
enjoyed a significant boost leading up to, and throughout the Iraq conflict. The 
correlation that could be made here will serve as ready ammunition for anti-PMI 
arguments, but does this extend from the unilateral level to the supranational? 
 
The multilateral nature of the UN Security Council ostensibly negates concerns about 
unilateral abuse, but as Wulf points out, this is often not the case. Internal politics will 
inevitably continue to play a role in the decisions made by the Security Council, but 
this is more to do with the structure of the UN itself, rather than the question of 
privatisation. At this point, a consequentialist trump is extremely tempting: since the 
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system already lends itself towards unilateral abuse, what more damage could be done 
by privatisation for humanitarian intervention? My concern with the reckless nature of 
such a move still stands, but the lack of an immediate solution does not mean that 
there is no way at all of resolving this issue. Herbert Wulf (2006) offers a process by 
which to restore the public monopoly of legitimate force. While it is essentially an 
anti-PMI argument, it can be cannibalised for the purpose of showing that measures 
are available for remedying the problem of unilateral interests affecting the 
supranational framework. Effectively, Wulf advocates a multilevel monopoly of force 
to account for the weakened nation-state and to assist states with especially poor 
governance. This multilevel system functions around a hierarchical structure that runs 
from the local and national levels to the regional and global levels. In this system, 
monopoly of force is to be exercised from the bottom-up in a subsidiary system. 
Norm setting would be based on supremacy and should take place from the top down. 
(Wulf 2006, p. 98-100) Wulf identifies inherent tension in the UN system that 
requires reform.
89
 This reform, he feels, must focus on overcoming democratic and 
security deficits. He places particular emphasis on the regulation of the PMI as a 
necessary aspect of this reform. As in the general PMI debate, Jurgen Brauer‘s 
argument that ―At issue is not how force is organised (public or private provision) but 
how organised the force is (regulated)‖ (Brauer, 2008, p. 112), is paramount to the 
question of legitimate privatised coercive force. 
 
The third area of concern is both a contributing factor to, and largely resultant of, the 
previous two. The question of legal accountability and regulation dominates the PMI 
debate. Domestic legislation is only part of the issue here. The real concern is at the 
international level. As shown in Chapter One, this legislation primarily consists of 
thirty-year-old Geneva Conventions and similarly venerable UN Laws. The treatment 
of private military contractors as mercenaries under these laws, and the variance of 
PMI treatment at the domestic level (the US compared to South Africa for instance) 
has created a significant grey area. This ambiguity can be overcome through revision 
by the UN Working Group on Mercenaries. Likewise, domestic laws will develop and 
mature. The South African progression from weak treatment of the industry to a hard-
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line but dangerously inflexible legislation appears to require further refinement 
Likewise, the U.S. approach to the PMI has been driven by recent events in Iraq 
which have necessitated a rethink of this issue.  
 
In addition, CSR can play a meaningful role in negating concerns about violations by 
contractors, if it is given the chance.  Granted, there are examples of ‗cowboy‘ 
behaviour despite the competitive market environment in Iraq, but this appears to be 
the exception, not the rule, and is certainly no worse than the behaviour of ECOMOG 
in Freetown. It should also be noted that these recent controversies have occurred 
from within an immature legal framework and, as Brooks argues, a set of 
circumstances that are ―unique and should not be taken as a model of future 
operations due to … unusual size, level of risk and policy value.‖ (Brooks 2008, p. 
123) Shaista Shameem, former UN Special Rapporteur, has urged that PMSCs be 
identified as private sector actors ―to which should be extended the corresponding 
principles and consultations, including the United Nations Global Compact,‖ (Ghebali 
2006, p. 217) which comprises a formal body of responsibilities of transnational 
corporations. At the time of her appointment to the post of Special Rapporteur, 
Shameem observed that a practical definition of mercenarism could only be reached 
after a policy decision had been reached ―on the fundamental question of whether 
States wish to continue to be solely responsible for the use of force.‖ (Ghebali 2006, 
p. 223) Considering the move towards globalisation, and the ‗erosion of the Weberian 
model‘ already discussed in this dissertation, progress here is easily conceivable. The 
argument can therefore be made that this entire area of concern can be resolved by the 
individual improvement of its constituent parts. If these elements are allowed to 
function together – up-to-date International treatment of the PMI (with an 
unambiguous definition of a mercenary), mature domestic legislation, a market with 
sufficient accountability for effective regulation to take place, and CSR playing a role 
– then a UN-Privatised African Peacekeeping scenario becomes a more viable reality. 
 
Overcoming these three interrelated areas of concern appears to have a ‗chicken and 
egg‘ quality. Both the intrinsic morality of the industry, and questions about the 
effects of privatisation on control of force require legislative regulation in order to 
truly overcome the conceptual concerns that they are based upon. The issue of 
regulation and accountability in turn requires that lawmaking bodies such as the UN, 
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and domestic legislators overcome conceptual apprehensions about the industry. This 
relationship is not condemned to paralysis however. The continually evolving nature 
of the global environment has a corresponding effect on political, legal and social 
institutions. As such, progress is being made on all three areas of concern.  
 
Ghebali makes special mention of the UN‘s shifting position toward mercenarism. He 
describes the progression from UN Special Rapporteur Enrique Bernales Ballesteros‘ 
―use of mercenaries as a means of violating human rights and impeding the exercise 
of the right to self-determination of peoples‖ (Ghebali 2006, p. 214) to his 
replacement, Shaista Shameem‘s call for a ―paradigm shift‖ (Ghebali 2006, p. 217). In 
the context of peacekeeping, Shameem views PMSCs as a means to help compensate 
for UN deficiencies when the latter is confronted with widespread violations of 
human rights and genocide. Furthermore, she advocates that this option ―need not be 
at the expense of the contributions to peacekeeping or peacebuilding missions by 
members States, but in addition to them provided there is properly registered vetting 
mechanism and guidelines for private companies put in place in advance.‖ (Ghebali 
2006, pp. 218-219)  Subsequently the position of Special Rapporteur has been 
replaced with a Working Group, which continues to investigate the issue of 
privatisation. 
 
The Motivation for Resisting Privatisation 
Despite the objections I have raised to the types of argument used, the basic 
motivation that drives the privatised peacekeeping proposal is still valid. 
Privatisation‘s promise of a cost effective and efficient means to supplement and 
conceivably solve (some) problems of UN peacekeeping, by filling the gap of in 
peacekeeping capacity, is persuasive. The cost-effectiveness and efficiency touted by 
the likes of the IPOA should however be approached with at least some degree of 
suspicion, rather than take as granted as is often the case. Singer argues that well-
supplied US troops in Iraq may have less to do with the natural efficiency of market-
forces resulting from privatisation of logistic functions, than with a blind faith in 
privatisation that had led the US government to blindly sign cheques. (Singer 2007, 
pp. 4-5) Aside from the hefty financial costs of this approach, Singer argues that the 
US may now be inextricably tethered to the PMI – unable to effectively conduct its 
military campaigns with them in support, but unable to mount military campaigns at 
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all without them. (Singer 2007, p. 1) ‗Filling the gap‘ by privatisation could 
conceivably make it impossible to ever close the gap without privatisation, unless 
careful measures are taken. This warning is largely reliant on observations from Iraq, 
and speculation. It does however point to a need for cognisance of the dangers of 
privatisation, in line with my argument against falling victim to the appeal of the 
immediacy of ‗consequentialist trump‘ type arguments.  
 
The common expediency argument often criticises the UN‘s stance on privatisation as 
reflecting a cruel indifference to humanitarian concerns. This is a mistake. As Ghebali 
comments, ―It would be wrong to assume that the choice for the UN is between 
outsourcing or indifference to protracted conflicts.‖ (Ghebali 2006 p. 226)  Indeed, 
the UN remains a viable means of security provision, in potential.  
 
There is also a tendency by pro-privatisation arguments to write off the current system 
entirely, despite continued reassurances that the PMI is not seen ―as a palliative to all 
conflict‖
90
 nor is it meant to replace the system. Granted, the UN peacekeeping 
system is flawed, and it appears that it will always be playing a game of catch-up with 
global political trends. (Masterton 2004, p. 5) But, for the most part, privatisation 
arguments simply offer a means of bypassing these flaws, but at potentially high cost. 
Instead, Doug Brooks‘ ‗Westernless peacekeeping‘ should ideally be resolved by 
greater Western contribution. Poor quality contributions from developing nations 
should be resolved by developing the capacity of these nations to contribute. Surely 
this is the kind of progress that is wanted for the UN system? Hough‘s comparison 
talks of particular issues with confused mandates resulting in poor performances by 
ECOMOG (Nigeria unilaterally changing the mandate), and UNAMSIL 
(peacekeepers not equipped for peace enforcement). This requires a revision of the 
mandate system – a process that is continually in motion at the Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations. This can be achieved with the assistance of privatisation, 
but cannot if privatisation is allowed to dominate. 
 
Peter W. Singer argues that the use of private military contractors appears to have 
harmed rather than helped the U.S. mission in Iraq. He further argues that this use has 
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created a dependency syndrome, that the U.S. has locked itself into a vicious cycle 
wherein ―It can‘t win with them, but can‘t go to war without them.‖ (Singer 2007, p.   
iii) His argument questions the financial efficiency of privatisation as it is currently 
employed by the U.S., and further argues that privatisation has come to dominate the 
military mission in Iraq and pushed it in directions contrary to the original military 
strategy deemed necessary to win a counterinsurgency. (Singer 2007, pp. 4-9, 13-15)    
 
Large scale privatisation might then actually harm the UN peacekeeping apparatus 
and hinder the continual development of the peacekeeping framework, and some 
(such as Singer) would argue that it should therefore be avoided in its entirety. I 
believe that this too is an overreaction, and that privatisation can indeed play a 
significant role in peacekeeping, if in no other way than to provide impetus for 
improvements in state‘s capacities. There is also danger in completely discarding the 
industry. As observed by Stephen Kinloch, ―Utopianism, when not reflected upon 
from a perspective in the real world, breeds dangerous ideologies and systems. 
Reality, when not impregnated by utopianism, is condemned to inaction and sterility.‖ 
(Spearin 2005, p. 250)  
 
The Motivation for Privatisation 
The following can be utilised as an alternative motivation to bolster an advanced 
expediency argument. There is a concern about the inevitable migration by the PMI to 
conflict ridden areas, such as Africa, whether it is legal or not. In much the same way 
that the Post-Cold War peace (and the post-Apartheid shrinking of the South African 
military) created a large pool of militarily trained potential contractors, a post-Iraq 
scenario will, arguably, result in an unbalanced supply and demand equation. US 
President-elect Barrack Obama has made it clear that he plans a rapid and total 
withdrawal from Iraq by 2011.
91
 The Iraqi-US Pact (unofficially referred to as the 
‗Withdrawal Pact‘ in the Arabic draft version released by Iraq) also stipulates a 
handover of mission control for all ground operations, as well as control of the Green 
Zone and Iraqi airspace as of January 1
st
 2009. At the time that this was written, a 
surprising addition in this pact had just been revealed: that the contractor immunity 
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from Iraqi law that has been enjoyed since Paul Bremer passed ‗Order 17‘ in 2003, 
will come to an end on Jan 1
st 
2009. Moreover, there is the possibility that retroactive 
legal action will be taken by the Iraqi government against contractors.
92
 This has 
obviously created many concerns not only amongst those who were involved in 
controversies but also for the PMI presence in Iraq in general. These changes could 
dramatically alter the conduct and nature of the PMI, and will certainly play a role in 
where and how the industry is employed in the future.  
 
A perpetual theme of concern relating to privatised force is that of unilateral 
employment. This relates to Western powers using PMSCs as proxies to conduct 
foreign policy in regions that are politically inaccessible. Given the likely political 
policies of the United States in the post-Iraq period, and its current investment in 
AFRICOM (African Command), concerns raised by Jan Schakowsky about 
Blackwater Worldwide‘s interests in (oil-rich) Darfur could be well founded. The 
concern about unilateral employment is especially worrying in the context of the 
general weak state-security of Africa. Consider that Executive Outcomes was 
employed by the Sierra Leone government, which had only recently changed hands 
by way of a coup, to fight the RUF rebels. During their tenure, the Sierra Leone 
government was again overthrown. In this kind of environment, it is easy to imagine 
elements of the PMI quickly regressing to the bottom-up, pre-modern form typical of 
the post-colonial days. (Wulf 2008, p. 192) 
 
The UN Working Group on Mercenaries is unlikely to provide a grand, all 
encompassing solution to the privatisation debate. It will, in all likelihood, instead 
continue the trend of gradual change in the UN‘s approach to privatisation – a trend in 
which the PSOI shows the way forward by offering a vital peacebuilding component 
and logistics for contributory members that lack these capabilities. This is not the 
beginning of a slippery slope argument. The privatisation of coercive force represents 
a point of singularity
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 in peacekeeping and should not simply be eased into. A major 
theme in my argument against reckless expedient actions in this arena, relates to the 





 Commonly used in the context of technological development to refer to a specific point, often a 
paradigm shift, which results in a massive acceleration in development. The privatisation of coercive 
force at the supranational level would constitute a major paradigm shift in political theory and 
specifically in the theory of intervention. 
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consequences of this step. These include necessitating a complete rethinking of 
entrenched notions of sovereignty and control of force, and additionally, of the UN 
framework itself. Changes of this sort carry a great deal of gravity Moreover, 
privatised intervention alone is not sufficient. Executive Outcomes‘ contribution to 
Sierra Leone could only achieve so much on its own (Pattison 2008, p. 29), but as 
Shearer noted, ―EO has always acknowledged its limitations‖ (Shearer 1998, p. 76). 
EO provided a focussed, aggressive intervention with the goal of destroying the 
RUF‘s capacity to threaten the security of the country. EO did not include 
peacebuilding in its mandate, nor could it realistically hope to achieve anything in that 
area, given the nature of the EO presence in the country. The UN did not engage with 
EO at the time that it pulled out, and the opportunity for an organised transition was 
lost. The slide back into chaos should not be brandished as proof that PMSC efforts 
fail at peacekeeping, but rather serve as evidence of inappropriate peacekeeping 
policy with regards to the integration of peace enforcement and peacebuilding, and 
coordination between the UN and private actors. These considerations point to a 
requirement for development both in the privatisation of peacekeeping operations and 
in the framework for peacekeeping operations in general. 
 
Conclusion 
The general argument for privatisation of peacekeeping operations is often packaged 
as a persuasive expediency argument. This argument points to the deficiencies in the 
current UN peacekeeping system, often empirically supported by citations of cases 
like the UN failure to prevent the Rwandan Genocide. UN failures in Africa appears 
to be a result of insufficient capacity to perform the duties required by contemporary 
peacekeeping. This is largely a result of insufficient support from Western powers, 
and poor quality contributions by developing nations and regional contributors. 
 
The PMI offers a means of overcoming this ‗gap in capacity‘. Many, both from within 
the industry and outside of it, argue that the nature of privatised operations can 
provide solutions and improvements in terms of costs and overall effectiveness.  
Particularly fervent calls for privatised peacekeeping promote a sort of expediency 
argument that argue that continued UN hesitance on the matter is in effect creating 
human suffering that could be avoided. In its extreme form, this argument for 
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expediency advocates a sort of ‗consequentialist trump‘, which morally overrides any 
other concerns that might exist about privatisation. 
 
In this chapter I have examined some of the contributors to this expediency-type 
argument. and critiqued two particular approaches to this: the ‗consequentialist trump‘ 
put forward by James Pattison; and the ‗non-profit‘ approach suggested by Tobias 
Masterton. I‘ve found both of these to be insufficient. In the case of the 
consequentialist trump, I have argued that it constitutes a dangerous type of thinking. 
The non-profit approach negates the benefits of self-imposed CSR, while focussing 
incorrectly on the need to resolve concerns about the intrinsic nature of mercenarism, 
instead of concentrating on the more troubling question of the consequences of private 
control of force.  
 
I have instead offered an alternative, an ‗advanced expediency argument‘, which 
features the same general thinking and motivation but does not simply override 
crucial issues relating to privatisation. These issues absolutely must be resolved 
before privatisation of coercive peace enforcement can become a reality. I have 
proposed ways in which these concerns can be resolved, and how privatisation can 
help peacekeeping initiatives in the interim, through support of peacebuilding. I have 
also submitted a prudential motivation for resolving the major issues holding back the 
privatisation of peacekeeping, while acknowledging criticisms of pro-privatisation 
claims pertaining to efficiency and cost effectiveness which further undermine the 
typical expediency forms of pro-privatisation argument.  
 
In this chapter, I have not been arguing specifically for, or against privatisation, but 
rather, I have been critically evaluating a dangerous type of argument which in some 
cases appears to completely reject the UN system as a viable means of securing peace 
and stability.  With this in mind, I have attempted to diffuse the element of immediacy 
in the expediency argument and instead offer a less reckless alternative to achieve the 
same goals, without condemning the UN. Doug Brooks himself, grudgingly concedes 
that the UN remains ―against all odds the natural solution to international peace and 
security problems because it has got ‗some surprising capabilities and expertise to 
help with humanitarian services, peacemaking and state building‘ and remains the 
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most qualified international organisation in the world capable of organising 





The purpose of this dissertation was to provide an evaluation of the proposal of 
privatised peacekeeping. In particular, this dissertation sought to evaluate a specific 
type of argument, an expediency argument, commonly raised in support of 
privatisation of peacekeeping. This expediency argument seeks to show the 
weaknesses of the current system of humanitarian intervention, in conjunction with 
the benefits and strengths offered by the Privatised Military Industry. This then serves 
as the basis for a ‗consequentialist trump‘ to override any objections to the industry or 
its employment in peacekeeping. In order to evaluate this type of argument, it was 
necessary to focus on the individual components which comprise it.  
 
It was the purpose of the first three chapters of this dissertation to explore why the 
world might not be ready for privatised peace. This began with a historical 
perspective, and brief exploration of the legal treatment of the industry. This revealed 
that an ambiguous legal definition of mercenaries is hindering any attempts to provide 
international regulation for the industry, which is treated subjectively at the domestic 
level. The next area to explore was the ethical debate on the topic. This revealed 
deontological and consequential approaches, as well as a debate around differentiating 
between historical mercenarism and the modern PMI. The deontological range of 
arguments focus on the intrinsic morality of the industry, with regards to sufficient 
justification for violence or the employment of force. The consequential range of 
arguments tends to focus on the issue of privatisation undermining the monopoly over 
the control of force. The question of differentiating between historical mercenarism 
and the modern PMI seems to hinge particularly on the latter. This overview provided 
a means of judging the validity of aspects of the expediency argument. 
 
The final preparatory chapter established the changing nature of peacekeeping and 
some of the factors that inhibit its effectiveness. Supranational peacekeeping suffers 
most from a lack of capacity to fulfil the requirements of contemporary peacekeeping. 
This evaluation provided an understanding of the ‗capacity gap‘ which expediency 
arguments offer the PMI as a means of filling. Moreover, arguments are presented 
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which show the privatised option is both cheaper and more efficient. This then 
contributes to the persuasiveness of the expediency argument. 
 
Despite these positive factors, there is still reluctance to privatise peacekeeping. 
While social and historical factors play a role, the fundamental issue appears to relate 
to concerns about accountability and regulation. As shown in Chapter One, regulating 
the industry requires both domestic legislation and international measures, which are 
lacking as a result of the ambiguous definition of mercenaries. This is largely because 
of the concerns raised about the industry, explored in Chapter Two. This is the 
impasse that faces privatised peacekeeping. At this point, the expediency argument 
offers a ‗consequentialist trump‘, which seeks to override these concerns according to 
consequentialist thinking. In Chapter Four, I argued that this type of thinking is 
reckless, and does not take into account the full gravity of the concerns about private 
control of force, especially for the multilateral use of coercive force for humanitarian 
purposes. I have argued that the consequences of this reckless consequentialism 
necessitate an alternative approach that systematically deals with those philosophical 
issues which require resolution before any progress can be made in defining the 
industry. In support of this, I have provided an alternative motivation that serves to 
drive the evolution of the peacekeeping system, and potentially integrate the private 
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